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The International Trend Toward Requiring Good
Cause for Tenant Eviction:
Dangerous Portents for the United States?
Andrea B. Carroll "

I.

INTRODUCTION

The developed world has made much progress in improving so
cial conditions over the last several centuries. Safe and plentiful food
and water, while once a daily struggle to achieve, are now significantly
easier to come by. 1 Technological advancements have made access to

medical care more readily available to the masses. 2 Both in Europe
and in the United States, times have changed and societies have re
sponded by innovating with new and beneficial legal constructs. But
no matter how far modern society progresses, there is one social
problem that it seems no society has gotten just right: housing. Al
most every major economic player on the globe has faced a self
described housing crisis in the last seventy-five years, and many of
3
these are perceived to continue even today. Although housing crises
may take many forms, they often manifest themselves as shortages of

• C.E. Laborde, Jr. Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul
M. Hebert Law Center. I thank the Southeastern Association of Law Schools and the
organizers of the Texas Junior Legal Scholars Conference for the opportunity to pre
sent and receive commentary on this Article at their 2007 meetings, as well as the
LSU Law Center for its generous research support. I am also grateful to N. Gregory
Smith and Vernon Palmer, whose insights were invaluable, and to Brandee Ketchum
(LSU Law Center Class of 2008 ) , who provided excellent research assistance.
1 Recent efforts in global sanitation resulted in a ten percent increase in areas
with access to safe water, giving over 1.2 billion additional persons access to clean wa
ter in 2004. See generally UNICEF PROGRESS REPORT: A REPORT CARD OF WATER AND
SAFE1Y (2006) , availabl,e at http:/ /www.unicef.org/media/files/Progress_for_Child
ren_No._5_English.pdf.
2
See T HE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1 999, HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 20TH
CENTURY6 ( 1 999) , available at http://www.who.int/whr/1999/en/whr99_chl_en.pdf
(attributing more than half of the gains in public health from 1950 to 1992, includ
ing declines in infant mortality and disease, to technological advances) .
3 See, e.g., VALERIE KARN & HAROLD WOLMAN, COMPARING HOUSING SYsTEMS 14344, 148 (1992) (describing housing crises in the United States and United King
dom).
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available and adequate housing, particularly in the rental market. 4
Rental housing shortages then lead to a whole host of other societal
_
problems, including, at the extreme end, homelessness.,
Public concern over housing issues has reached an all-time high.
Perhaps the most telling recent example comes from the French
struggle to solve its housing problems. In early 2007, a group of pro
testers referred to as "Les Enfants de Don Quichotte' ("The Children of
Don Quixote") set up a tent city in one of Paris' most vibrant areas.
Those involved were protesting the state of the housing market in
France. 6 And they were not all homeless. Even some of the social
elite of France came out, albeit temporarily, to support the dream ad
vocated by Les Enfants. 7 In response to such an undeniable outcry for
action on the housing situation in France, the government detailed a
proposal to "create a legal right to housing."8 A bill that went before
the French parliament in March, 2007 proposed a legally enforceable
guarantee of safe and sanitary housing for all. 9 On March 5, 2007, the
bill passed, making France only the second European country (be
10
hind Scotland) to guarantee such a right.

"
�.

Id. at 148.

See Curtis Berger, Bryond Homef£ssness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45

U. MIAMI L.

REV. 315, 321-24 (1990).

"

French

Vows to Help Homeless,

BBC NEWS, Jan.

1, 2007,

availab/,e at
French PM Vows]; see
alm J ohn Ward Anderson, Tent Cities Across France Stake Claims for the HomelRss: Chirac
PromiJe.\ A Right to Housing, But Doubt Remains, WASH. PosT, jan. 11, 2007, at A22 (not
PM

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6227237.stm [hereinafter
.

ing promise by then-presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy that, if he were elected,
"no _homeless people would be on the streets of Paris in two years").

' Frendi PM Vows, supra note 6.
" Law No. 2007-290 of March 5, 2007, journal Officiel de Ia Republique Fran
<;aise (1.0.] [Official Gazette of France], March 5, 2007, p. 4190, availabl,e at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow "Les autres textes Iegislatifs et reglementaires"
·

hyperlink). The law guarantees the right to "decent and independent" housing to
any permanent French resi dent if the resident is not able to provide or maint.ain
such housing by his own means. Id.
"
Id.
w

The Scottish Executive appointed a task force in 1999 to make recommen da

tions on remedying and preventing homelessness.

HOMELESSNESS TASK FORCE FINAL

REPORT, HEl.l'!NC HOMELESS PEOPLE: AN ACTION PlAN FOR PREVENTION AND EFFECTIVE
RESl'C �NSE

(2002). available at

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/library3/society/htff.pdf

_
[h�·re maftcr
H '.1.P!NG HOMELESS PEO PL E]. The task force's report grew out of the
�
.
.
pnnt :1plc tha � everyon e m
Scotland should have dry, warm, affordable and secure
.
housmg[, which] . . 1s . . . crucial to family life, physical and mental health child
.

development_. employability and the creation of sustainable communities."

Jd.

at I.

As a result of the 2002 report, the Executive enacted The Homelessness Act of 2003.

The Homelessness (Scotland) Act, 2003,
housmg to all homeless persons. Id.

(A.S.P. 10). The Act extends the right to
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The French development is an interesting one, particularly in
light of the fact that a multitude of European jurisdictions seem to
sympathize with the sentiment behind it.

France may be one of the

only countries to governmentally guarantee housing, but at least nine
European countries have declared it a fundamental right held by all
mankind.11

Even across the Atlantic in the United States, the notion

that adequate housing is a core right is taking hold, though certainly
more slowly than it has in Europe.

12

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the French movement is
that, if the government guarantees housing, it must then implement
that plan.

How is this guaranteed housing to be provided? Not sur

prisingly, the French plan provides only scant detail about the vehicle
11

See, e.g. , BELG. CONST. art. 23 ("Everyone has the right to lead a life in conformity with human dignity.... These rights include notably . . . the right to have decent accommodation . ... ") ; FIN. CONST.§ 19 ("The public authorities shall promote
the right of everyone to housing and the opportunity to arrange their own hous
ing."); 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution] 21 (Greece) (" The provision of homes
to those who are homeless or live in inadequate housing conditions shall be the sub
ject of special care by the State.");Gw. [Constitution] art. 22 ( Neth.) ("It shall be the
concern of the authorities to provide sufficient living accommodation."); PORT.
CONST. art. 65 (2005) ("Everyone has the right for himself and his family to a dwell
ing of adequate size satisfying standards of hygiene and comfort and preserving per
sonal and family privacy.");CONSTITUCION [C.E.] 47 (Spain) ("All Spaniards have the
right to enjoy decent and adequate housing. "); REGERINGSFORMEN [RF]
[Constitution] 1:2 (Swed.) ("It shall be incumbent upon the public administration to
secure . . . housing and education, and to promote social care and social security and
a good living environment.");HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE, supra note 10, at 1 (noting
the Scottish view of housing as "crucial to family life "); Law No. 89-462 of July 8,
1989, Journal Officiel de la Republique Frarn;aise Q.O.] [Official Gazette of France],
July 8, 1989, p. 8541, available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow "Les autres
textes legislatifs et reglementaires" hyperlink); see also Jane Ball, Renting Homes: Status
and Security in the UK and France-A Comparison in the Light of the Law Commissions Pro

as a
fundamental right). For international agreements recognizing a fundamental right
to housing, see Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 2l 7A, at 25(1),
U.N. GA OR, 3d Sess., lst plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html ("Everyone has the right to a standard of
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including .
·housing ... . ");International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200A, at 11(1) (Jan. 3, 1976), availabl,e at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu3/b/a_cescr.htm ("The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, includ
ing adequate . . . housing .. . [and] will take appropriate steps to insure the realiza
tion of this right .. .. ).

posals, CoNV.,Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 38-60 (recognizing the French right to housing

·

12

"

Peter Salins commented that one of the typical concomitants to good cause
e�ction provisions, rent regulation, "is not only entrenched, it is spreading. Like
a hen creatures in a science fiction movie, the tentacles of rent regulation have long
.
smce wandered from historic epicenters such as New York City and now reach every
corner of this nation." Peter Satins, Reflections on Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient
Re gulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 775, 775-76 (1988).
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through which the social goal of decent housing for all is to be
achieved. 13 The creation of a mass of new public housing is certainly
a possibility. 14

But just as likely is the continuation of an old Euro

pean favorite-maintaining a scheme of good cause eviction, both in
the public and private rental housing sectors, to control supply.
The base notion of a good cause eviction scheme is that a land
lord's ability to terminate or refuse to renew his tenant's lease, and
therefore force the tenant to navigate a possibly perilous housing
market to find new accommodations, must be limited substantially. 15
Regardless of the fact that a tenant may have no lease at all, or that
the term of the lease he once had may have expired, he may continue
in the rental housing unless and until the landlord offers a good
.
'
16
enoug h reason to eVIct him.
Good cause eviction rules are pervasive in European countries,
and are almost universally designed to rectify housing crises, particu
larly those caused by housing shortages.17

The evidence, however,

demonstrates that they do not solve supply problems, and in fact may
even impede achievement of social housing goals by creating new
economic problems.
With the proliferation of housing problems all over the globe,
and an increased awareness of and call for action on those problems
like the one seen in France, a real danger exists that good cause evic
tion requirements will spread worldwide. Even in the United States,
these dangerous schemes have begun to take hold.
This Article seeks to call awareness to that problem and to sug
gest that further intrusion must be prevented.

13

Law No.

2007-290

of March

5, 2007, Journal

Part II describes the

Officiel de la Republique Fran

r;aise U.O.] [Official Gazette of France], March 5, 2007, p. 4190, availab"le at
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow "Les autres textes legislatifs et reglementaires"
hyperlink).

14 The French government intends to construct 120,000 new homes per year un
2012 in an effort to implement this new g uarantee of housing. See French PM Vows,
supra note 6. In 2000, France spent €19.27 billion on various housing assistance pro
grams, including €2.05 billion in construction subsidies, €5.34 billion in aid to indi
viduals, and €9.39 billion in tax relief. Embassy of France in the United States, Hous

til

ing in France, availabl.e at http:/ /www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/h ousing.asp.
15

Kenneth Salzberg & Audrey Zibelman, Good Cause Eviction,

REV. 61, 62-63
16

(1985).

21 WILLAMETIE L.

Id. Good cause eviction is premised on a "tenant's presumptive right to continue in possession." Id.
i1
.
Housmg s hortages following World War I led to the adoption of good cause
eviction schemes in Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy. See infra Part
II. In the United States, post-war housing shortages led to the imposition of a good
cause eviction scheme in Washington, D.C. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying
text.
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growing global movement toward limiting tenant eviction to good
cause. The law of several European jurisdictions serves to illustrate
the varying forms and effects of a good cause eviction scheme. Part
III goes on to describe the reasons for which a jurisdiction's adoption
of a good cause eviction scheme represents a serious misstep. The
negative and substantial long-term economic effects are detailed.
Part IV demonstrates that good cause eviction schemes are slowly in
fecting even American law. Finally, Part V suggests that if we are not
successful in warding off the further intrusion of good cause eviction
schemes in this country, we will suffer. Good cause eviction rules will
fail to solve housing crises here, just as they have in Europe. And just
as we are seeing abroad, in the long term, we may end up worse off
for their adoption.
II. TH E

GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO LIMIT

LANDLORD ABILI1Y TO EVICT OR REFUSE TO RENEW LEASES

Schemes of good cause eviction are quite prevalent throughout
Europe. Those countries that have adopted them with the hope of
solving serious housing problems are by no means small or insignifi
cant actors on the international scene. Germany, Italy, and France,
for instance, all limit the right of a landlord to evict his tenant, or to
refuse to renew an expired lease, to good cause.18 Smaller countries,
such as Portugal and Austria, have followed suit. 19
Precisely what will satisfy the requirement of good cause varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Faulty or culpable behavior on the
part of the tenant-such as failing to pay rent for an extended pe
riod, conducting illegal activities on the premises, or breaching the
20
Some good
lease in some significant way-almost always suffices.
18 See D.C. STAFFORD, THE ECONOMICS OF HOUSING POLICY 45
the E nglish trend toward security of tenure over the last decade).
19
See SANDRA PASSINHAS, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM

(1978) (describing
AT THE EUROPEAN

UNIVERSI'IY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISAT ION OF PRIVATE LAWS-PORTUGAL

1 (2004),

http:/ /www.eui.eu/LAW /ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Pro
jects/TenancyLawPortugal.pdf; BRIGITTA LURGER & ANDREA HABERL, EUROPEAN
availab/,e

at

PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSI'IY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF
PRIVATE LAW-AUSTRIA 1 (2004), availab/,e at http://www.eui.eu/LAW/Research
Teaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawAustria. pdf.
The European
Tenancy Law project, of which both of these articles are a part, is an ongoing re
search project of the European Private Law Forum at the European University Insti
tute concerned with a comparative assessment of national tenancy Jaws among Euro
pean Union countries.
20
See, e.g., MARiA ESTHER BLAS L6PEZ, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE
EU ROPEAN UNIVERSI'IY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW-SPAIN

10-

http://www.eui.eu/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPriv
ateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawSpain.pdf (Spanish grounds for eviction include, inter

11, (2004),

availab/,e at
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cause eviction schemes even provide for more landlord-focused rea
sons, including the landlord's desire to demolish or remodel his
building, or perhaps even to occupy it himself.

21

While it may seem at first blush that there really is no common
thread among jurisdictions employing the scheme as to what that
good cause might be, further study brings a commonality to light.
Nearly every jurisdiction that limits landlord eviction to good cause
interprets it in a very narrow fashion and heavily skews it in favor of
the tenant.
A.

An Exceptionally Narrow View of Landlord Need as Good Cause
Perhaps one of the more commonly proffered "good causes" for

which landlords seek to evict or fail to renew the leases of their ten
ants, at least absent some tenant misconduct, is their own need of the

premises. 22 Given a property owner's right to use his investment as he
so desires, one might expect jurisdictions to be rather liberal in allow
ing landlord need to provide the good cause necessary to evict a ten
ant.

In fact, precisely the opposite is true.

Most jurisdictions with a

good cause eviction scheme employ a very restrictive standard. Land
lord "need" must, really, be more than need. It must be desperation.
Portuguese law provides an instructive example of the applica
tion of the "need" standard.

The rights of landlords and tenants in

Portugal are set out both in the Portuguese Civil Code and in special
statutes, which substantially restrict a landlord's right to bring an end

to a lease. 23

When a landlord and tenant perfect a lease contract without a
definite term in Portugal, the law supplies a default term of six

alia, failure to pay rent, intentionally causing "unauthorized works in the house," and
using the premises for purposes other than that for which they were leased);
PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 25 (good cause for eviction under Portuguese law in
c�udes, inter alia, failure to pay rent, using the premises for "unlawful, indecent and
dishonest practices," and substantially changing the premises).
21 s
. , p,,.
ee zn1.a Part 11.A-B.
22
See, e.g., Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
on H.R. 355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.), availab/,e at http://www.ius.info/EUII/euchr/doku
me�ti/1995 � I I /case_of_velosa_barreto_v._portugal_21_1l_l995.html.
!h.e ClVl.l Code sets out the basic rules applicable to the landlord-tenant rela.
Uonsh1p m Portugal. Special statutory schemes, including the Rural Tenancy Regime
(Decree-Law 385.88, of 25.10 (1988)), Forester Tenancy Regime (Decree-Law
394/88, of 8.11 (1988)), and Urban Tenancy Regime (Decree-Law 321-B/90, of
1 5.10 (1990)) expand upon and further those general rules of the Civil Code in par
.
Ucular contexts.
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months. 24

But because the law also provides for automatic renewal

for successive periods, such a lease essentially becomes a lease of in
definite duration, which lasts until one party gives notice of his con
trary intention. 25 The Portuguese tenant may give notice of his inten
tion to quit without proffering any specific reason.

He need only

comply with a requirement that h e give the notice within a particular
f
period before he vacates. 2 ' Landlords, on the other h and, are not af-

forded the same freedom. They may terminate only when they prove:

( 1) need in themselves or their descendants to occupy the leased
(2) need of the leased property to build a home for them
selves or their first degree descendants; (3) desire to expand the
property;

leased premises or increase the number of leased units, but only if

the relevant public authority has already approved an architectural
plan; or

( 4) that public authorities have found the building to be

"degraded and, technically or e conomically, . . . not recommended to

be improved."27

Even when a Portuguese landlord can make out one of these
grounds, however, he may not succeed in retaking the premises.

If

the landlord seeks to terminate for "residential purposes" (essentially
the first and second grounds), he must also prove that he has owned
the property for more than five years28 and that he (or his descen
dants, if h e is arguing their need) cannot possibly find "another
house (owned or rented)" anywhere "in the area of the judicial dis
tricts of Lisboa or Porto or their surrounding areas, or, for another

part of the country, in the same city" that will meet their housing

need. 29 This latter requirement, of course, is virtually never satisfied,

as landlords can nearly always find other, albeit less desirable, ac
commodations. 30
24

PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26. Residential tenancy contracts in Portugal may
not provide a term of less than five years; when they do, they are typically considered
indefinite term contracts subject to the rules detailed here. Id. at 24.
25 Id. at 26.
26

The length of the notice required depends upon how long the lease has ex.
isted. Tenants must generally give six months notice to leave a lease that has lasted
more than six years, sixty days for leases lasting between one and six years, thirty days
for leases lasting between three months and a year, and one-third of the duration for
leases lasting less than three months. CODE CIVIL [C. crv.] art. 1055 (Port.) (1966);
see al,so PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26.
27
PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 26-27.
28
This requirement does not apply where the landlord acquired the property "by
hereditary succession." Id. at 27.
29
30

Id.

A landlord's existing cramped living area shared with seven other people, for
.
mstan ce, would likely supply cause for denying his claim to evict tenants under the
Portuguese need standard because that landlord has a home. See generally Velosa
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Moreover, even where a Portuguese landlord meets every one of
these exceptionally rigorous requirements-he proves a dire need,
five years ownership, and a lack of any other housing possibility-he
may have to suffer through a delay before the eviction will be carried
out. Portuguese courts are empowered to delay evictions for up to a
year "for social reasons."31
poraneous

Specifically, if a court finds that contem

enforcement of a

valid eviction order

would

effect

"greater prejudice to the tenant than benefits [to] the landlord" or
"[w]hen it is the tenant's poverty that motivates the lack of payment
of rent" (for which, of course, the landlord could legitimately evict),
it is authorized to impose a stay on the eviction. 32 Analyzing such so
cial mores might involve considering the parties' "good faith, the fact
that [the] tenant may become homeless, the number of persons liv
ing with the tenant, his or her age, his or her health, and, in general,
the social and economic condition of the people involved. "33
The case of Velosa Barreto

v.

Portugaf1 illustrates the breadth and

inequity of the Portuguese need standard.

Applicant Velosa Barreto

inherited a three-bedroom, one-bath home in the Portuguese city of
Funchal. 35 The home had been rented for roughly eighteen years be
fore Velosa Barreto became owner, with a rent that increased by only
twenty-five percent during that period. 36 Five months after he inher
ited the home, Velosa Barreto brought an action against the tenant,
seeking to end the lease so that Velosa Barreto and his family could
occupy the home. 37
Velosa Barreto argued that his family had a true need for the
home, which justified the termination of the tenants' lease. 38 Specifi-

Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 355 (Eur. Ct.
H.R.) (refusing landlord's request to evict tenant to personally occupy space because
landlord had alternative accommodations).
31 PASSINHAS, supra note 19, at 28.
3� Id.
33 Id.
34 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
35 Id.
!16

Id. The facts of Velosa Barreto do not clarify the precise term of the lease on the
subject property. Because the Portuguese Civil Code provides for continual tacit re
newal in the absence of tenant notice to quit, however, the lease can be likened to an
American periodic tenancy. See C. CIV. art. 1095 (Port.) (1966), repea/,ed by Decree
Law 321-B/90, of Oct. 15, 1990 (reenacting rule as part of new Urban Tenancy Re
_
gime).
37 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
38 Id.

2008]
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cally, he pointed to his own unsatisfactory living conditions. '9 At the
time of his suit, Velosa Barreto lived in a four-bedroom rental with his
wife and son, his mother- and father-in-law, his brother-in-law, and
two of his wife's aunts.40 The quarters were exceptionally crowded.41
Privacy for all members of the family was virtually nonexistent, and it
was not possible for his child to have his own room. 42 All of the par
ties involved were unhappy, but "resigned" to these living conditions
because he and his family had "nowhere else to live."4�
After the litigation stretched on for nearly six years, 44 the Fun
chal court denied Velosa Barreto's application for an order authoriz
ing the eviction, finding that he had not sufficiently shown "facts
which proved a real need to occupy the house himself. "4'' The court
particularly noted Velosa Barreto's failure to prove exceptionally
strained relations with his in-laws. 46 That the family got along rather
well personally and made the best of an ugly situation actually hurt
Velosa Barreto. 47

In the absence of proof of all out warfare in the

household, the Funchal court concluded that Velosa Barreto and his
family had no real "need" for a home of their own. 48
On appeal to the Lisbon Court of Appeals, the Funchal court's
judgment was affirmed.49 Finally, in

1991, Velosa Barreto appealed to

the European Commission of Human Rights, 50 which ultimately re
ferred the case to the European Court of Human Rights.51
Velosa Barreto argued before the European Court of Human
Rights that the Portuguese court system's refusal to grant him an or-

39

Id.

'0

Id.

41

Id.

42
o

Id.

Vel osa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).

44 Id. The European Court of Human Rights opinion provides no hint as to the
reason for the lengthy delay. Id.
<5

46

Id.
Id.

41

Id.

48

Id.

49 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
50
51

Id.

Id. The European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959 as a mecha.
msm to enforce the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen
tal Freedoms, drafted by the Council of Europe in 1950. Portugal ratified the Con
_
vention
on Sept. 11, 1978. See European Court of Human Rights-The Court,
http://ww w.echr.coe.int/ECHR/E N/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+t
he+Court.
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der allowing termination of the lease amounted to a violation of Arti
cle 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.52 On its own
motion, the Court also examined Velosa Barreto' s application to de
termine whether there might also be a violation of Article 1 of Proto
col 1 of the Convention. 53

Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights pro
vides:
. I. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of the na
tional security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pr otec
tion of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others. 54

Protocol 1 provides similarly:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions ex
cept in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the
right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to con
trol the use of property in accordance with the general interest or
to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penal•

tJes.

55

Velosa Barreto argued that Article 8 implies a right in every fam
ily "to a home for themselves alone."56 He maintained that Portugal's
failure to allow him to assert that right by evicting his tenant
amounted to an unacceptable intrusion on his rights under Article
57
8.

52 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
5� Id.
54 See Convention for the Protection of Human Right� and Fundamental Free
doms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
55 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Protocol 1, Mar. 20, 1952, Eur. T.S. No. 009. Portugal ratified Protocol I on Sept. 9,
1978. See Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun
damental Freedoms-Ratification Dates, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Com
mun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=009&C-M=8&DF=2/21/2008&CL=ENG.
56 Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv.
on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
57 Id.
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In assessing Velosa Barreto's application, the European Court of
Human Rights was required to examine Portuguese eviction law in
some detail."�

Its role was not to determine whether Velosa Barreto

met the legal requirements for eviction; that fell within the province
of the Portuguese courts, which "were clearly better placed than the
European Court to assess the facts at a given time and place."59
Rather, the European Court of Human RighLc; was to determine
whether the Portuguese legislation provided a restraint on landlords
that rose to a level sufficient to impinge on the benefitc; they enjoy
under the European Convention on Human Rights.1;0
In so analyzing the Portuguese tenancy termination rules, the
Court found that the goal of the good cause eviction scheme was "a
legitimate [one], namely the social protection of tenants."1;1

In es

sence, the restrictions "tend[] to promote the economic well-being of
the country and the protection of the rights of others."62 Essentially,
then, the Court found that Portugal could, in accordance with the
language of Article 8, subordinate the right of a private landowner to
the economic wellbeing of the country.
To satisfy itself that such subordination was "necessary," as Arti
cle 8 requires, the Court looked to the history surrounding the en
actment of the Portuguese Civil Code articles restricting eviction to
need on the part of the landlord. i;� At one time, such onerous intru
sions upon the right of the landowner to retake his property were
considered absolutely necessary in light of a severe shortage of hous
ing in Funchal.64

By the time of Velosa Barreto's action, however,

census records demonstrated that no such crisis persisted. 6"

None

theless, the European Court of Human Rights accepted Portugal's
argument that strict tenancy termination provisions continued to be
necessary to avoid economic decline. 66

Thus, the Court voted eight

to one that Velosa Barreto's Article 8 "right to respect for his family

58
s9

60
61
i;2

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
63
64

65

66

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and private life, his home and his correspondence" yielded to Portu
gal's need to r estrict that right in the interest of economics.67
Similarly, the Court found that Protocol 1 allowed for govern
mental fixing of eviction standards.

Although the plain language of

the provision prohibits deprivations of "peaceful enjoyment of pos
sessions," it allows for the creation of exceptions states may find nec
essary to "control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest

.

.

.."68

In essence, Protocol 1 requires only that the Portu

guese eviction rules "strike a fair balance between the demands of the
general interest of the community and the requirements of the pro
tection of the individual's fundamental rights."69

The European

Court of Human Rights accepted Portugal's argument that the appli
cation of its eviction rules to deprive Velosa Barreto of the right to
enjoy the property he owned was merely a "control of the use" of his
property.70 As such, Velosa Barreto's interest fell, again by a vote of
eight to one, to his father's tenant.71
Thus, in 1995,

thirty-one years after the lease began

and nearly thir

teen years after Velosa Barreto inherited the property at issue, he was
still unable to assert his right to occupy the property he owned. 72 The
effect of the decision, then, is essentially to create a persistent and vir
tually interminable lease. Velosa Barreto could hardly have shown
more substantial need to occupy his property.

a

Still, it was not

enough.
Tenant protections are clearly exceptionally strong under the
Portuguese regime. Indeed, commentators well-versed in the coun
try's tenancy law have remarked that "the main feature of the regime
is the protection of the tenant, considered to be the weaker party to
the contract."73

67

Id.

One dissenter found that the court did not give sufficient weight to the

possibility that Velosa Barreto might choose to increase the size of his family, a right
the dissenter viewed as an important element of family life. Id. The dissent also con
cluded that the majority did not strike a fair balance between the protecting the right
of the landlord (to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions) and the right of the ten
ant. Id.
68

Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No. 18072/91, 1995 YB. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
355 (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
69
10

Id.
Id.

71 Id.
72
73

Id.

supra note 19, at I; see Jeremy McBride, The Right to Property, 21 EUR.
HUM. RTS. SURV. 40, 45-47 (1996) (discussing a "remarkably indulgent
VIew ... of the overriding right of property owners to recover their apartments from
tenants").
PASSINHAS,

�· REV.
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And the arguably egregiously broad tenant protections that exist

in Portugal, surprisingly, are not the most stifling provisions one can

find in Europe. The basic Swedish rule of lease termination is that a
tenant "enjoys the right to prolong [his lease] contract."74 A tenant's
right to persist on the premises may only be set aside if his reasons for

renewing his contract are not as strong as his landlord's reasons for

terminating the agreement.;' Furthermore, landlords are at a signifi
cant disadvantage in Sweden because, even under this balancing test,
if a landlord rents an apartment dwelling to a tenant on an indefinite
duration lease, the landlord's argument that he has true need of the
prop erty for his own use will "not be a sufficient reason for terminat
ing the contract."76

Swedish law does make concessions for a land

lord renting out a famil y home. 77

True need may provide grounds

for giving notice to end a lease in these cases, "at least if [the land
lord] intends to live [on the premises] permanently."18 But a person
letting an apartment dwelling has no such freedom.
The trend in Europe, then, is to sanction landlord need as a
technical way of making out the good cause needed to evict or refuse

to renew the lease of a tenant. But the Portuguese and Swedish ex
amples demonstrate that need is viewed so restrictively that, practi
cally speaking, landlord desire to personally occupy the rented prem

ises hardly ever rises to the level of "good cause."
B.

An Overemphasis on Protection of Weak Tenants
The history of Italian landlord-tenant law demonstrates quite

well the related trend of European tenancy law to overprotect tenants
that could be viewed as the least bit socially disadvantaged. Substan
tial regulation of the law o f leases began in Italy shortly after World

War I, when financial strife and a short supply of h ousing created
problems in the country's rental housing market.79
ernment responded in

The Italian gov

1921 with a double-featured plan that both

N

Jordabalk UB] [Land Law Code] 12:3 (Swed.). See VLF JENSEN, EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSilY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF
PRIVATE LAW-S'v\-'EDEN 3 (2004), availab/,e at http://iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/

Eur<;>peanPrivateLaw /TenancyLawSweden. pdf.
10

76
11
7s

JENSEN, supra note 74, at 24.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.

79

UMBERTO BRECCIA & ELENA BARGELLI, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE
EUROPEAN UNIVERSilY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW-ITALY 1
(2004), available at http://www.eui.eu/law/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw
/Projects/TenancyLawltaly.pdf.
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80
.
.
controlled rent an d prevented termmation
of tenancy contracts.

Even in the post-war economy, that system "was considered an assault
on individual property rights."81 The regime provoked so much out
rage that, while it was not expressly held unconstitutional, the Italian

Constitutional Court suggested that the regime be jettisoned and re

placed with a more practical system for regulating tenancy as soon as
.
82
practicable.
The post-war Italian system was revamped in the 1970s and a new

and complete statute for regulating both residential and commercial
tenancies took hold in 1978.83 The new statute focused primarily on
setting standards for rents. ·Because of this focus, it was dubbed the
"equo canone' (or "fair rent") law. 84 The scheme was "founded upon

the rationale of distributive justice" and thus greatly emphasized ten

ant need and the right to housing over the desires of landlord
owners. 85 The overt protections given to tenants seemed broad, but
perhaps not totally slanted, at least on the face of the statute. Short
term tenancy contracts were not permitted under the equo canone law.
Parties were not allowed to perfect lease contracts for periods shorter
than four years.86 And the landlord, at least, was bound to continue
the lease for the duration of the agreed-upon term.87

Tenants, in

contrast, were permitted to end even a term lease merely by giving six

months notice. 88

Regardless of the length of the lease, the most ten

ant-friendly aspect of the equo canone law was that part which took the
setting of the rent completely out of the parties' hands. Rent was
fixed by law, and was not a subject on which the parties were permit
ted to come to their own agreement.89
However these rent and term restrictions looked on paper, they

were applied by the Italian government in a manner exceptionally
oppressive to private property owners.

And even worse, when rent

controls and intrusions into parties' freedom of contract in the form
80
81
82

Id.
Id.

Id. The Court furthe r h inted th at it would n ot he si tate to strike d own the re g ime we re it not replaced with in a re ason able pe riod. Id.
83
Id. at 2.
84
See id.; see also Kenne th Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 735 (1983) (n oting that Italy's equo canone l aw was
based on the ide a th at e qu ity would be obtained in the hou sing m arket if c ompara
ble rents we re established for comparable u n its).
85
BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra n ote 79, at 1.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
sg Id.
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of long-term tenancy requirements did not succeed in creating a
housing situation that the Italian government found desirable, it re
sorted to layering suspension of eviction orders on top of the rent
and term provisions in a manner that further prejudiced landlords.90
The case of Spadea v. Italy perfectly demonstrates the problem of
Italian focus on the socially disadvantaged party to the lease con
tract. 91 Applicants Spadea and Scalabrino purchased two residential
flats in Milan, Italy in April of 1 982. 92 The flats were rented at the
time of the purchase, with leases set to expire on December 31,
1982. �3 In October of that year, the applicants properly gave notice
to the tenants occupying the flats, requesting that they vacate the
premises at the expiration of the lease term. 94 The tenants, "elderly
ladies of modest means," refused to budge. 95 Spadea and Scalabrino
requested eviction orders from a local magistrate, and those orders
were issued in January of 1 983. 96 Two years later, in 1985, the tenants
still refused to vacate and the Italian government would offer no po
lice assistance in securing the e viction.97 Moreover, in February of
1985, the Italian government suspended enforcement of all eviction
orders for another eleven months. 98 Shortly after that eviction en
forcement order was lifted, another came into effect. 9!1 And then yet
100 As
another.
the years wore on, Spadea and Scalabrino were forced
to buy another flat just so as to have a place to live.10 1
Spadea and Scalabrino finally recovered possession of their flats,
six and seven years after the leases on them terminated. 102 Even then,
it was not a result of a change in Italian law, but rather as a result of
fortuity. One tenant died and the other eventually left voluntarily. 103
If the Spadea case were an exceptional one, we might lament it as
an unfortunate, but not dangerous, set of circumstances. When
viewed as anomalous, it seems, perhaps, less egregious. Unfortu90

91

92
!I;\

�i4
%
91;

97

98
99

i oo
IOI

w2
103

Id. at 14-15.
Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 1 2868/87,
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Spadea, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Spadea,

21 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 484.

21

Eur. H.R. Rep.

482 (1996).
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nately, a glance at even a small portion of the Italian landlord-tenant
jurisprudence quickly proves that what happened to Spadea and
Scalabrino was not at all rare.

Scores of landlords met similar fates

under the Italian tenancy regime of the 1980s.

In another Italian

eviction case that made its way to the European Court of Human
Rights-Scollo

v.

Italy

1°4

-the plaintiff-landlord complained of eviction

staggering and suspension orders that prevented him from evicting �
tenant whose lease had ended more than eleven years earlier.

10"

Much like the applicants in Spadea, Scollo regained possession of his
property, eleven years after the termination of the lease and after
seven years without full payment of the agreed upon rent, solely be
cause the tenant voluntarily left.

106

Likewise, in Immobiliare Saffi v. It
1 7
aly, 0 the applicant company regained possession of its property thir
108

teen years after the lease ended.

Police assistance was never given

to secure the eviction, but the tenant eventually died.

109

In short, the Italian regime of the late 1970s and 1 980s was one
that effected serious oppression of landlord interests in the name of
social justice and economic development. The series of eviction sus
pension orders issued during this time were often referred to as nec
essary and "emergency" measures to quell a serious shortage of low
11
income housing . 0 But the fact is that the purportedly "emergency"

provisions remained in effect for more than forty years.

111

Subordina

tion of landlord interests, then, essentially became the norm in Italy.
The equo canone regime-both in its obsessive rent controls and

corollary eviction suspension orders-was soon recognized as an un

acceptable one . Cases such as Spadea, Scollo, and Immobiliare Saffi illus

trated the flaws of the Italian tenancy laws and eventually led people
to conclude that the regime's effect was the opposite of that in

tended . In practice, it failed to solve the problem of a small supply of
adequate low-cost housing, but rather "dissuaded landlords from let
11
ting their property, thus increasing demand." 2
For these reasons, the equo canone regime was set aside in 1998,

at least insofar as residential properties are concerned, in favor of a
104
105

106

107
108

App. No. 22774/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 1 4 (1999) .
Id. at 5 15-1 6.
Id. at 516.

App. No. 22774/93, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756 ( 1999 ) .
Id. at 759.
109
Id.
110
See id. at 758; Scollo, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 525 ( Mr. H.G. Schermers, dissenting);
see also BRECCIA & BARGELLI, sum-a note 79 ' at 1-2.
1'"
Ill
McBride, supra note 73, at 46.
112
BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 2.
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new regime. 113 The goal of Italy's new tenancy law was to effectuate a
"trade off' be tween the typically diametric interests of landlords and
tenants. 1 14 Whether the regime actually accomplishes this lofty goal is
a matter o n which interested parties may never come to agreement.
The

1 998 statute essentially relies on a combination of duration

and termination provisions to effectuate the tenant protection that
Italy has long desired as a matter of social policy. 115 Residential lease
contracts may not establish a term of less than four years.

1 16

This is

already an obviously onerous provision for landlords. Typically, how
ever, it gets even worse for them. The statute allows a landlord to re
take his property after the termination of the lease, provided he has
given the tenant at least six months notice to vacate . 1 17 The problem
is that this notice will only be effec tive if the landlord has "legitimate
18
grounds" for terminating the lease. 1
The expiration of the lease
term, surprisingly, is insufficient to supply such a ground. Essentially,
a landlord will only be permitted to retake his premises after the ex
piration of the original lease when he can demonstrate that his "in
terests take priority over [the] tenant's right to housing." 119 In effect,
the landlord is forced to show some sort of "good cause" for evicting
a tenant whose term lease has expired.
This "good cause" or "legitimate ground, " as one might imagine
given Italy's historical penchant for protecting tenants, garners a nar
row definition in Italian law, though perhaps it is not so narrow as in
Portugal.

A landlord's desire ( presumably, need is not required) to

"use the apartment for himself o r his family members for housing or
1 20 A
nything less is rather difficult
professional purposes" will suffice.
to allege as a legitimate reason for enforcing the termination of an
already expired lease.

A landlord may technically make out good

cause where he wishes to use the premises not for living or for work
ing, but for "public, cultural, [or] religious purposes," but only when
2
he also offers the existing tenant an alternate accommodation. 1 1

113
1 14
ur;

116

Id.
Id.

at 1 3.

Id.

Id. This rule applies where the landlord and tenant freely n egotiate the lease.
The minimum duration is shortened to three years where the parties allow landlord
and tenant associations to supply a ceiling for the rent. Id.
111

1 18

Id.

B RECCIA & BARGELLI, supra note 79, at 1 4.
Id. at 13.
120
Id. at 1
The la dlord is allowed to terminate a tenancy on this ground only
_
after servmg six months notice
( after completion of a four year tenancy) Id
1 19

.

121

�·

�

·

Id.

·
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In the absence of proof of a legitimate ground, the I talian lease
122
At the end of the reconducted lease
renews for another four years.
term, again, the landlord may terminate only upon giving a six
month notice to his tenant, but this time, no legitimate ground for
termination is needed along with the notice. 12:1 The mere expiration
of the lease term is sufficient ground for recognizing the end of the
parties' relationship.
In effect, then, absent "good cause," an Italian landlord is stuck
with a lease lasting at least eight years! And even worse, after this
eight years expires, he may still find himself unable to retake posses
sion of his property. Just as striking as the good cause provisions of
the 1998 statute is the fact that it c arries forward, albeit in modified
form, the notion behind the eviction suspension orders of the 1978
Italian regime. 1 24 Although eviction suspension is not generally pro
vided for as it was in 1978, the 1998 statute retains it "if the house is
situated in a highly populated municipal district." 125 In such areas, a
valid eviction order is typically suspended for six months. And where
the tenant is "unemployed," sixty-five years old, or has at least five
126
children, the suspension stretches to eighteen months.
Thus, a
landlord that e ntered into a simple four-year lease-the very shortest
duration Italian law would allow him to perfect-may find himself
stuck with a lease of nearly ten years with no way out.
Unfortunately, Italy is not alon e in overprotecting tenants. In
Germany, perhaps the biggest tenant protection comes from the fact
that lease contracts limited in time are generally not allowed. The
German Civil Code provides that such a "fixed term contract can only
12'
be concluded if the landlord has a reason for such a limitation."
Legitimate reasons for perfecting a term contract would include the
landlord's desire to live in the premises himself, or a planned renova
tion that would not be possible or would be overly burdensome if a
1
tenant were living on the premises. 28 The landlord must inform his

122
m
124
125
126
127

Id. at 15.
Id.
BRECCIA & BARGELLI, supra n ote 79, at 1 5 .
Id.
Id.

See WOLFGANG WURMNESf, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW-GERMANY 37, available

at http://www.iue . i t/law/ResearchTe aching/European PrivateL aw/Projects/Ten anc
yL awGermany.pdf; see also Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [ C iv il Code] Aug. 18,
1 896, Bundesgesetz bl att, Teil I [BGBI. I ] , as amended , § 5 7 5.
m

See BGB § 575, 1 1 ; see also WURMNEST, supra n ote 1 27, at 37-38.

2008]

GOOD CA USE EVICTION

445

tenant of his rationale for seeking a term contract in writing. 129 As a
result of these rather stringent rules, as one might imagine, most
1
leases in Germany are deemed to be contracts of unlimited time. 30
This extended tenure certainly provides German tenants with a large
measure of protection not present in leases perfected in the United
States.
And the German tenant protections do not stop there. Their
rules governing termination of leases by notice are also substantially
protective of tenants. Specifically, German notice provisions are
quite lopsided. A tenant may end an indefinite duration lease at any
time merely by giving a three-month notice. 1 3 1 No justification is nec
essary. The landlord, on the other hand, "has relatively few possibili
ties to terminate the [lease] contract." 1 32 He may terminate the lease
by giving notice only where he has a "legitimate interest" in the con
tract's termination. 133 And, of course, the German Civil Code defines
this "legitimate interest" quite narrowly. The sole circumstances suf
ficient to warrant termination of the ongoing tenancy relationship
are: ( 1 ) tenant breach of a contractual duty; (2) landlord need for
the leased premises; 1 34 or (3) a lease contract that "prevents the land
lord from making an economicallyjustifiable use of the premises." 1 35
The restrictive grounds for landlord notice already narrow the
factual scenarios that will give rise to a valid termination by landlord
notice quite substantially. But German law then deals another blow
to landlords who can meet this stringent burden by allowing the ten
ant to contest the termination and demand continuation of the lease
if termination "would give rise to hardship for the tenant or his family
that would be unjustified even in the light of the legitimate interests
of the landlord." 1 36 Moreover, even if the interests of the landlord
outweigh those of the tenant and the eviction is deemed lawful and

12�•
130
131
132
13'.<
134

WURMNEST, supra note 1 2 7, at 38.
See id.
See id. ; see also BGB § 573c, 1 1 .
WURMNEST, supra note 1 2 7, at 34.
Id.

This requirement can be satisfied by a personal need on the part of the land
lord, or a need of one of his family members, though German courts have been re
luctant to find the notice proper for need of a brother-in-law or sister-in-law. Id. at
35-36.
135
See id. at 34; see also BGB § 573, 1 2.
136
WURMNEST, supra note 1 27, at 34. Some German leases are exempt from these
harsh requirements. The rules set out here do not apply, for instance, where the
landlord is living in the premises himself. Id.
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appropriate, a court may delay it upon the tenant's request for up to
" 137
one year " to av01· d har ds h'1p.
And if the Italian and German examples are not telling enough,

the modern French tenancy law is perhaps the most overt European
example of an emphasis on the rights of the tenant at the expense of

landlords.

The bulk of the curren t French landlord-tenant law was

enacted in 1981 by a socialist regime that believed the thrust of ten
ancy law should be to "protect the weak party against the stronger,

i.e. [,] the tenant against the landlord. Tenants were considered to be

abused by unscrupulous landlords taking advantage . . . [of their lack
of] legal protection. " 1 38 Several revisions have modified the French
tenancy regime since 1 98 1 , but its salient features remain.
are exceptionally well-protected.

Tenants

As with most European landlords,

French landlords may terminate lease contracts only for "legitimate
and serious reason." 1 39
Perhaps the most tenant-frie ndly aspect of French law is its

treatment of eviction enforcement.

In all cases, French judges have

absolute discretion to grant tenants delais de grace of up to three years.
The court must find that "seriously unfair consequences could result
from the eviction" to grant such a delay. 1 40 But presumably some
thing less than abject homelessness will do.

Waiting for the end of

the school year for the children o r completing an employment pro

ject, for example, may provide sufficient grounds for postponement
of an eviction order. 141

Even more tenant-friendly, however, is the

French rule that no landlord may evict a tenant during the winter.

m
�

1

Id. at 36.

FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN

.

& ANTHONY CHAMBOREDON, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW
UNIVERSI1Y INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE

NATALIE BOCCADORO

availab/,e at http:/ /www .iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/Euro
peanPrivateLaw/Projects/TenancyLawFrance.pdf.
LAW-FRANCE 2 (2004) ,

1 �9 Such reasons include, inter alia, the desire to sell the leased
property and the
desire to live on the premises or to allow a family member to do so. Law No. 89-462
ofJuly 6, 1994, Journal Officiel de la Republique Franc;aise U.O.) [Official Gazette of
France] , July 8 , 1 989, p. 8543, art. 15, available at http://www. legifrance.gouv.fr (fol
low "Les autres textes legislatifs et reglementaires" hyperlink) ; see also BocCADORO &

CHAMBOREDON,

supra note 138, at 2. This requirement is less protective of tenant
rights in France than it is in other countries discussed herein, however. This is true
because the indefinite duration lease is prohibited under French law. Thus, when we
speak of a landlord "giving notice, " that notice is one that will end a fixed term lease.
Nevertheless, lease terms are protective of French tenants, since they may be per

fected for a minimum of three years (or six years if the landlord is a legal entitv
'
rather than an individual) . Id.
140

141

BOCCADORO

Id.

& CHAMBOREDON, supra note 1 38, at 18.
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The effect of this delay of grace is to suspend evictions for more than
15. 1 2
4
one third of every year-namely, from November I to March
In short, European tenancy regimes can be characterized

as

al

most shockingly protective of tenants-at the expense, of course, of
their landlords.

Good cause eviction schemes alone offer tenants a

wealth of protection. And when the grounds for good cause are in
terpreted narrowly, or the good cause scheme is bolstered with evic
tion suspension orders for "weak" occupants, landlords suffer signifi
cant disadvantages.
III. THE DELETERIOUS ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF A Goon CAUSE SCHEME

Even setting aside the fact that rules requiring good cause for
tenant eviction or lease nonrenewal may represent a theoretically un

justifiable balancing of the interests of equally innocent and needy
private parties, such rules should be rejected because they are detri
mental from an economic standpoint.

The majority of jurisdictions

that have adopted a good cause eviction standard have done so to
solve particular economic crises. Yet both basic economic theory and
empirical evidence demonstrate that good cause eviction rules have
nearly the opposite economic effect of that intended.
A.

Exacerbating the Problem ofDwindling Supply
Stringent restrictions upon the right of landlords to evict tenants

are typically enacted in times of housing shortage.

The idea is a

rather simple one. If a great deal of affordable rental housing is not
available, government feels pressure to act to protect tenants and to
ensure that they are able to retain the housing they h ave for as long
as possible. 1 43 The easiest way for the law to promote tenant protec

tion is to impose a requirement upon landlords to refrain from evict142

Id. The suspension begins from October 1 5 in Paris. Law No. 90-449 of May
3 1 , 1990 U.O.] [Official Gazette of FranceJ , June 2, 1990, p. 655 1 , art. 2 1 , availab/,e at
http:/ /www. legifrance.gouv.fr (follow "Les autres textes legislatifs et reglementaires"
hyperlink) . The Polish landlord-tenant regime provides a similar winter suspension
from November 1 to March 3 1 "for humanitarian reasons." EWA GROMNICKA &
PRZEMYSlAW ZYSK, EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW FORUM AT THE EUROPEAN UNIVERSI1Y
INSTITUTE, THE EUROPEANISATION OF PRIVATE LAW-POUND 33 ( 2004) , availab/,e at
http:/ /www. iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/ Projects/Tenancy
LawPoland. pdf.
143

Robert G. Lee,

Rent Control-The Economic Impact ofSocial Legislation,

1 2 OXFORD

J. LEGAL STUD. 543, 544 ( 1992 ) . The goal of rent control, at least, is "to choke off
speculation (or price inflation) in times of economic crisis, when strong demand
faces a limited supply." SHLOMO ANGEL, HOUSING POLICY MATTERS: A GLOBAL
ANALYSIS 1 20 (2000) .
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ing their tenants absent good cause, often layered with controls on
.
144
the rent imposed .
One failing of this strategy is that it can never achieve a long
term solution to the problem it seeks to remedy. Both requirements

of good cause eviction alone and the rent controls that typically ac
company the m actually serve to discourage new investmen t in rental
property, and thus hold stagnant the existing level of rental housing

Potential investors are h ighly unlikely to purchase rental
properties knowing that they will b e subject to an especially stringent
145
First, the effe ctive loss of the ability to dispose of
eviction standard.

supply.

property substantially disincentivizes housing market invest
ment. 1 46 What prospective landlord would pursue rental investments
in the face of the utterly abysmal fates that befell the landlords in the
the

Velosa Barreto

147

and Spadea

148

cases?

The landlords' inability to make

any use of the properties in those cases or even to sell the property
for anything approaching a reasonable rate of return certainly of

fends notions of the rights that should be afforded to the owners of
private property.
1

44

149

It is not surprising, perhaps, that the sale of

Rent controls are almost always a part of a good cause eviction scheme be

cause, in the absence of a controlled rent, a landlord desiring to end a lease without
good cause would escape the lease merely by raising the rent until it reached a level
impossible for the tenant to meet.

No " eviction" would occur, and the landlord

Lawrence Berger, The New &sidential Tenancy Law

would therefore avoid liability.

Are Landlords Public Utilities ?, 60 NEB. L. REv. 707, 727-28 ( 1 98 1 ) .
Literally hundreds of volumes have been published both defending and attacking
rent control. It seems that both legal scholars and economists are split as to whether
it provides any real economic benefits.

This paper focuses on good cause eviction,

not rent control, while recognizing that rent control may play a significant role in an
overall scheme of good cause eviction. For an influential and thorough debate of
the multitude of issues raised by rent control schemes, see generally Richard A. Ep
stein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient &gulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 ( 1 988)
and the eight responses printed in that same volume, id. at 1 2 1 5-80. The effect of
rent control from a purely theoretical economic perspective is nicely explored in

Steven N.S. Cheung, A Theory ofPrice Control, l 7J.L.
4
1 '>
·

See Berger, supra note 1 44, at 730.

& ECON. 53 ( 1 974) .

146 While, in theory, a landlord with a tenant subject to eviction only for aood
cause may always just sell his property, reality demonstrates otherwise . · The hi the
landlord takes on market value is typically significant enough to make disposal, at

�

�� practically s peaking, an unacceptable option.

le

Velosa Barreto v. Portugal, App. No.
3554 (Eur. Ct. H.R. ) .
1 8
49

Lee, supra note 1 43, at 55 1-52.
1 8072/ 9 1 , 1 995 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.

Spadea v. Italy, App. No. 1 2868/87, 2 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 482 ( 1 996)
.
In civil law systems, property owners are afforded
the right to use the items
they own, or to derive the fruits of them.
But perhaps the most important feature of
true owners h'1p is th e nght of the owner
to d}spose of that which he owns in any
manner he sees fit. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITE
ELEMENTARIE DE DROIT CIVIL [TREATISE
0
E
pt. 2, No.
332, at 80 (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans. 1959)
(1
) ( That which charactenzes the
nght of ownership . . . is the power of dispos1

·

�;; �IVIL LA�]

·

�

�
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rental units with "sitting tenants" that may only be evicted for good
cause typically brings thirty to forty percent less than their vacant
counterparts. 1 50

The financial effect of a landlord's assumption of a

rental subject to the good cause eviction requirement-particularly in
a case like Scollo, where no rent was paid for more than seven
years

151

.

-1s astound'mg1y d1scouragmg.
'
•

i;2

Of course, these conse-

quences also stymie other would-be investors. 1

5

3

Even beyond the significant and direct financial disincentive im
posed by a good cause eviction requirement, there is a more subtle
and emotional disincentive. The mere "fear of being unable to evict
a disliked tenant," even after the initial term of the landlord-tenant
relationship has expired, has been referred to as a "potential loss of
psychic income." 154 This emotional consideration has been shown to
be nearly as significant to landlords as financial ones. 155 British land
lords, for instance, typically express a greater dissatisfaction with se
curity of tenure provisions than they do with their rent control counterparts.

156

ing of the thing, by consuming it, by physically destroying it and by transforming its
substance . " ) .
1
50 Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy, App. No. 22774/93, 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 756, 778
(1999) .
151
Scollo v. Italy, App. No. 1 9 1 33/9 1 , 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 5 1 4 ( 1 996) (Eur. Ct.
H.R. ) .
152
The Scoll-0 facts are not confined to Italy. They could easily be duplicated in
the United States. Extreme tenant protection has resulted in making eviction ex
tremely difficult for landlords, even where their tenants have stopped paying rent.
PETER D. SALINS, THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION 73 ( 1980) . In this way, the
rules of tenancy depart from almost every other contractual relationship known to
the law. In other sale and lease transactions, payment of the price is a necessary
component of the relationship between the parties. The merchandise provided must
also be of a certain quality. But if it falls short, the remedy is "an annulment of the
transaction." Id. at 74. Buyer receives a return of the price and seller gets the good
back.
"Under almost no circumstances is the remedy for an unsatisfied pur
chaser/lessee the continued enjoyment of the 'flawed' good or service for free." Id.
153
But see Kenneth K Baar, Would the Abolition of Rent Controls Restore a Free Market ?,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1 2 3 1 , 1 232-33 ( 1 989) (suggesting that the empirical evidence on
the effect of rent control on supply is varied) . A few studies have found "no correla
tion between rent controls and the volume of apartment construction." Id. at 1 233.
154
Lee, supra note 143, at 55 1 .
155
See JOHN ALLEN & LINDA McDOWELL, LANDLORDS AND PROPERTY 43 ( 1 989) . Evidence submitted to Britain's Environment Committee indicated that small landlords
(of which there were over 500,000) considered security of tenure legislation to be a
"major influence" upon their decision to rent residential property. Id.
1s6
L'k
r ewise, studies demonstrate that security of tenure "is the single most important determinant of housing demand for all households, overshadowing the impor
tance of both the quality of structures and the amount of living space." See ANGEL,
supra note 1 43, at 3 1 5 ; see generally Axel Borsch-Supan, Econometric Analysis of Discrete
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Second, the illiquidity of a rental home burdened by good cause
· eviction requirements dissuades investors.

Real estate investors are

more likely interested in a long-term, stable investment than are in
157
vestors in, for instance, the stock market.
But even real estate inves
tors typically desire a somewhat fleeting arrangement. The illiquidity
resulting from good cause eviction rules and the "problem of gaining
access to the capital [invested] at the most opportune time may be
1
sufficient to dissuade" even the most committed investor. 58 The on
going, near perpetual nature of a lease subject to a good cause evic
tion rule deprives the landlord of the ability to sell at a "vacant pos
session price," 159 effectively controlling his ability to exit as owner.
Limiting the potential investor's exit opportunities in such an ex
treme way is not only theoretically objectionable, but is practically
160 Wh
unworkable.
en investment in an uncontrolled ( or, at least,
more reasonably controlled)

private market (including the stock

market, for instance) is easily and r eadily available, there simply is not
sufficient incentive for investors to turn to the housing market. A fo
cus on other investments makes more sense.
Good cause eviction requirem ents, then, certainly discourage in
vestment in the market for rental housing, either through the pur
chase of existing dwellings devoted to rental or through the construc
tion of new rental dwellings.

But the rules may do even greater

damage by depleting the existing rental housing stock. In light of the
negative financial and emotional constraints outlined above, land
lords newly faced with good cause eviction requirements tend to opt
for conversion of their rental dwellings at the earliest possible oppor
161
tunity.
They will convert their rental properties to alternative,

on

the Demand for Housing in the U.S. and West Germany, 296
1 1 8 ( 1987) .
1
57 A 1995 survey of private property owners and managers revealed that their
primary reason for acquiring rental property was to earn rental income (for small
property owners) and long-term capital gains (for medium and large-scale property
owners) . HOWARD SAVAGE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED ABOL'T
PROPERTIES, OWNERS, AND TENANTS FROM THE 1995 PROPERlY OWNERS AND MANAGERS
Su�� I ( 1998) , http://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/hl 2 1 -9801 .pdf.
See Lee , supra note 1 43, at 552; see also HAROLD L. WOLMAi'J, HOUSING AND
HOUSING POLICY IN THE U.S. AND U.K. 63 ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
159 T
T •�"
�
" & WOLMAN, supra note 3, at 1 44 .
160
See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A . Heller, The Liberal Commons, 1 1 0 YALE L J . 549,
567-70 (200 1 ) (property regimes that make "exit impractical . . . or that unreasona
bly delay exit [are] incompatible with the most fundamental liberal tenets" ) .
161
See �pstem, supra note 144, at 763-64. Of course, since a tenant typically may
not be evicted because of the landlord's conversion desires, the landlord must often
wait for the existing tenant to voluntarily vacate the premises. See WOLMAN, supra
Choice with Applications
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higher-value uses in order to reap larger returns on their often sig
nificant financial investments. This may involve converting the prop
erty into a dwelling for their own use, or perhaps converting it into
condominium living. 162 Good cause eviction requirements create in

centives for such conversions by diminishing the value of investments
in rental housing and thereby decreasing existing rental stock. The
regulation , therefore , causes the very depletion of housing that it at1
tempts to remedy. 63

The U nited Kingdom 's experience with good cause eviction and
rent control nicely illustrates investor reaction to the disposal and il
1
liquidity effects of those legal rules. 64 Long periods of good cause
eviction accompanied by rent control there have "progressively para
lyzed the supply of houses for rent and perpetuated shortage ." 1 65 The
percentage of British households accommodated by the rental hous
ing market plummeted from ninety percent to less than seven per-

note 1 58, at 63 (landlord desiring to convert must either "bribe" existing tenants to
move or wait for them to leave voluntarily) .
162
See Epstein, supra note 1 44, at 765; see also Louis M. Rea & Dipak K. Gupta, The
Rent Control Controversy: A Consideration of The California Experience, 4 GLENDALE L. REV.
105, 1 34 ( 1 98 1 ) . Many cities have enacted ordinances curtailing the rights of prop
erty owners to convert property to condominiums. For example, Pleasanton, Cali
fornia, passed a 2006 ordinance requiring any person seeking to convert rental
property into condominiums to grant a right of first refusal to low income tenants.
PLEASANTON,
CAL.,
CODE
§
1 7.04. 100
(2007) ,
availab/,e
at
http://qcode. us/codes/pleasanton. The law further provides that very low income
tenants have the right to continue their existing leases for nine years from the date of
notice of intended conversion. Id. These rules were established to "minimize or
avoid the hardship caused by the displacement of tenants." Id. § 1 7.04.030. San
Francisco regulates condominium conversion through a lottery system under which
only 200 units per year are allowed to be converted. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.,
SUBDMSION CODE § 1 396.1 (2007) . In addition to providing such a small number of
conversions, the Code provides that landlords must provide for temporary tenant re
location and must bear the cost of moving expenses for any tenant. Id. §§ 1 392-1393.
Applications to the conversion lottery are prohibited if a landlord has had two or
more evictions after May 2005 or even one eviction, if it involved a senior citizen, dis
abled person, or catastrophically ill tenant. Id. § 1 396.2.
lli3
See, e.g., Thomas S. Nesslein, Market versus Planning: An Assessment of the Swedish
Housing Model in the Post-war Period, 40 URB. STUDIES 1259, 1 269 (2003) .
64
1
The British first adopted good cause eviction rules (along with rent control) in
the early twentieth century as a measure to remedy housing shortages caused by
'Yorld War I. And although their tenancy rules have changed rather dramatically
smce, good cause eviction remains as a key feature of the United Kingdom's tenancy
regime. THE LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER No. 162, RENTING HOMES 1:
STATUS AND SECURJ1Y 23, 5 1 -52 (2002) , availabk at http:/ /www.lawcom.gov.
uk/docs/cpl 62.pdf [hereinafter RENTING HOMES] ; see generally DAVID HUGHES ET AL.
,
TEXT AND MATERIALS ON HOUSING LAW 1 1 8-56 (2005).
1 65 sTAFFORD,
supra note 1 8 , at 1 1 4.
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cent after the adoption of a good cause eviction scheme.

lhh

The p u r

ported solutions to the severe housing shortage in the Unite King
. flats empty 7 or to
dom have only encouraged landlords to keep their

�

make altogether different investments.

In the wake of its good cause

eviction rules, England has seen significant occurrence o f empty
property, a record number of homeless, and slow-rising capital re
turns. 168

All of these effects can be attributed to a wide n ing of the

supply-demand gap that should have been anticipated.

Restricting a

landlord's right to such an extreme degree will necessarily disincen
tivize him from supplying his social good, exacerbating the problem
of an already low supply. Good cause eviction as a solution for reme
dying

low

supply

fails

because

it

"con travene [es

economic rules of supply and demand."

!1
16

basic ]

m icro

If a state is going to reduce private profit and thereby diminish
speculative activity in the rental market, its only hope of not realizing
a perpetuation of the low supply problem would come with increased
1
state production of housing. 10 The market effect of disincentivizing
individual investment activity creates a need for the state to play a
171
Historically,
substantial role in the production of new housing.
governments have shied away from performing such functions
either because of the significant resources required to competitively
supply adequate housing or because of concern that, for political rea
sons, such activities are best left to the free market.

172

And where

government has attempted to remedy low supply through its own in-

1 66

Ray Forrest & Alan Murie, Restructuring the Welfare State: Privatization of Public
Housing in Britain, in HOUSING NEEDS & POLICY APPROACHES: TRENDS IN THIRTEEN
COUNTRIES 97-109 (Willem van Vilet et al. eds.,
167

168

1
69
170

1985 ) .

158, at 63.
STAFFORD, supra note 18, at 1 1 4.
Satins, supra note 1 2, at 775.

WOLMAN, supra note

See generally LEONARD SILK, SWEDEN PLANS FOR BETTER HOUSING 74-83 ( 1 948 ) .
promise t o provi de ade
quate housing to all its citizens, plans to produce over 120,000 hous i n g units per year
for the next five years. See French PM Vows, supra note 6.
171
The risk extends beyond the tenants subject to good cause eviction. See gnw1c
ally Michael Schill, Comment on Chester Hartman and David R.obinson 's "Eviction;: The
Hidden Housing Problem, " 1 4 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 503, 506 (2003) . Schill argues
that tenancy restrictions like rent control can also have a negative impact on non
rent controlled tenants of the landlord. According to Schill a landlord who can
make up for decreased rent from one tenant by increasing that collected from an
other likely will. And where this is not possible, he is likely to cut back maintenance
of all his holdings, and possibly even abandon the property. Id.
172
ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 540 (R.H. Campbell e d . , Oxford Univ.
Press 1979) (1776) (describing the struggle between free market capitalism and gov
The French government, for example, to make good on its

,

ernment regulation ) .
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volvement in housing production, the results have been disappoin t
ing at best.
Sweden provides the clearest illustration of a failed government
control model. 173 To rectify shortages in the wake of World War II,
Sweden opted for government regulation of all features of housing
production, including the type and cost of housing construction. 174
The idea was that housing shortages were caused, at least in part, by
excessive construction costs and that governme nt control could solve
that problem and thereby reduce costs to tenants. 1 75 To effectuate
this shift, the Swedish government controlled rents, imposed a good
cause eviction scheme, and controlled production with subsidized fi
nancing. 176 Unfortunately, however, pushing housing construction
out of the capitalistic market and essentially creating a "socialist hous
ing market" 177 has caused building costs to skyrocket to untenable
rates. 178 Rising costs are not the only failure of the system. Socioeco
nomic segregation in Sweden is worse than ever. 1 79 The Swedish gov
ernment assumed that simultaneous controls of rent and production
173

See Nesslein, supra note 1 63, at 1 269; see generally Deborah Kenn, One Nation 's
Dream, Another's Reality: Housingjustice in Sweden, 22 BROOK. ]. INT'L L. 63 ( 1 996) (de
scribing Sweden's good cause eviction regime) .
174
Kenn, supra note 173 , at 80-8 1 .
175
Id.; see also Nesslein, supra note 1 63, at 1 270.
17G
Nesslein, supra note 1 63, at 1 262.
177
Kenn, supra note 1 73, at 80.
178 Nesslein, supra note 1 63, at 1 270.
By 1985, Swedish housing costs were re
ported to be forty-three percent above the average of those of other European coun
tries and thirty-five percent above those of the United States. Id. By 1990, those
building costs had increased to twice as high as those in the United States. Id. As of
the mid-l 990s, Swedish housing costs were still twice as high as those in this country,
even after adjusting building costs for the economies of scale associated with larger
housing square footage in the United States. Id. at 1 27 1 . This disparity is thought to
be caused, in part, both by the lack of competition in the construction industry and
by the development of "special economic-interest groups," including construction
and building materials firms, housing bureaucracy groups, municipal housing com
panies, and national housing cooperatives. Id. These groups have an economic in
centive to "subsidi [ze] away" rising building costs in order to support" otherwise non
economically viable new construction. Id. In contrast, the American, largely free
market housing system has generated construction costs considered to be the lowest
among high-income countries. Id. at 1 265. Housing costs per square meter, as of
1990, according to the Global Housing Indicators Program were: ( 1 ) Japan-$2604;
(2) Finland-$1 734; (3) Sweden-$1 527; (4) Norway-$1426; (5) Germany-$1 305; and
(6) the United States-$500. Id.
179
Id. at 1 274. In 1997, a Swedish government investigation revealed that in the
country's three largest cities-Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo-class segrega
.
tJon was more pronounced than i t had been at any time during the pre-War period .
Id. In those areas, unemployment often exceeds fifty percent. Id. The study noted
that residential segregation had begun to overlap with social and ethnic segregation.
Id.
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would provide housing opportunities to all inc� me groups and elimi
_
nate segregation by ethnicity and socioeconomic status, but qmte
the
0
opposite has resulted. 1 8 All in all, most housing experts and econo
mists agree that the Swedish model has not worked and should not
181
be emulated.

The result of good cause eviction rules is somewhat of a Catch-

22: The rules necessarily perpetuate, if not overtly cause, housing
82
But if the government steps in to remedy that shortage

shortages. 1

by controlling the construction market, the high costs that result
cause the housing market to further suffer. 1 83 The only real solution
is to avoid the Catch-22 by rej ecting good cause eviction require
ments altogether. The free market for rental housing certainly has its
flaws, but none so great as those resulting from good cause eviction
84
schemes that seek to rernedy th em. 1

B.

Decreasing the Quality ofExisting Rental Housing
Even beyond the serious supply problem that rules requiring

good cause for tenant eviction create, there is a more fundamental
problem with the theory. The tren d in the post-World War era is to
impose good cause eviction as a sort of measure to guarantee the
right of quality, affordable housing to all mankind. 1 85 But the effect

180
1 1
8

Id. at 1 273-74.
Id. at 1277 ("The general lesson is that both theory and much real-world evi

dence strongly suggest that the Swedish m odel is not a model that should be emu
lated in the search for equitable and efficient housing outcomes .") . But see Kenn,
supra note 173, at 63 (lauding the Swedish system as an "available prototype" for the
United States) .
182

At least one author has found rent control, which almost necessarily includes a
good cause eviction rule, to be the most significant predictor of homelessness. See
William Tucker, Where do the Home/,ess Come From ?, NAT'L REV., Sept. 25, 1 987, at 4 1 .
8
1 3

Shlomo Angel, in his excellent work on global housing policy, has character
ized the debate as one between enabling and nonenabling government intervention

and has aptly noted that " [n] either laissez faire nor the centrally planned economy
have survived the test of time." ANGEL, supra note 143, at 13.
184

See generally Lenore Schloming & Skip Schloming, Comment on Chester Hartman
and David Robinson 's "Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, " 14 HOUSING PoL'Y

DEBATE 529 (2003) . According to the Schlomings, who are President and Executive
Director of the Small Property Owners Association, rental housing is an exceptionally

un-monopolistic market. Id. at 536. Using 1 990 Census data, the authors estimate
that seventy-five percent of rental housing is owned, not by large investors, but by
small-scale landlords. Id. "No business sector in the country has as many owners,
with holdings inversely small . . . . The natural searching and matching of owners to
tenants in such a highly diversified market is freedom itself, with the desire to find
good owners/good tenants constraining both sides to behave themselves." Id.
l!!!j

See BELG. CONST. art. 23 (describing constitutional and legislative "rights to
housing" in several nations) .
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of imposing good cause eviction requirements, ironically, is to actu
ally decrease the quality of rental housing.
Good cause eviction requirements insure stability for tenants
and, particularly if they are accompanied by rent control, tend to
push tenants toward maintaining their status quo as renters rather
than purchasing their own homes. Well-respected sociological re
search demonstrates that people simply do not care for items they are
using in the same manner as items they own. 1 86 The incentives good
cause eviction requirements create for tenants, therefore, serve to
lessen the continuing quality of the premises they occupy.
Further, the necessarily lengthy term of leases with good cause
eviction requirements increases the dilapidation of rental housing by
increasing costs and narrowing the landlord's rate of return. 187 Faced
with a significantly less profitable investment, a landlord is likely to
make only those repairs absolutely required, to do so in the cheapest
manner possible, and to do so only when forced. 1 88 Continued main
tenance of rental property simply becomes increasingly unprofitable
under a good cause eviction scheme. 1 89 Likewise, the landlord is
186

Even in long term rental situations, property owners are the only parties with a
stake in maintaining the value of their property, and thus they are the parties most
likell to take steps to preserve that value. See, e.g. , ANGEL, supra note 143, at 85.
18
In Sweden, for instance, researchers have found that rental housing consists
primarily of highly dense spaces, "monotonous in design and with little attractive
landscaping," that because of lack of maintenance and "problem tenants" has fallen
into serious disrepair. Nesslein, supra note 1 63, at 1266.
188
See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 1 44, at 6 1 ; Schloming & Schloming, supra note
184, at 533 (describing small property owners, the paradigmatic low-cost housing
owner, as blue collar individuals, "typically just one to two steps above their tenants
on the income scale," who often self-maintain and "delay costly capital improve
ments as long as possible [, nursing] a leaky roof and old plumbing along to squeeze
out a few more years of life before spending big bucks") .
189
George Sternlieb described well the reality of the landlord's dwindling returns
to the United States House of Representatives in 1971 :
One of the most satisfying figments of folklore in our times is the
portrait of the slum landlord. A typical vision is that of the central city
slums being the fiefdom of a small group of large investors. The latter
in turn grow very fat indeed on the high rents and low input which
their tenants and buildings are subjected to.
I have called it a satisfying illusion because it has in turn permitted
us the belief that all that is required in low-income housing was a repar
titioning of an already adequate rent pie. Whether through code en
forcement, rent controls, or any of a host of other m echanisms, the
problem of good maintenance could be resolved by squeezing some of
the excess profits out of landlords' hands. This process would still
leave enough of a residue to maintain his self-interests i n the longevity
and satisfactory quality of the structure in question.
This bit of folklore may have had considerable validity a decade or
two ago. It has little relationship to the realities currently.
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highly unlikely to take any steps to improve the premises (beyond
merely "repairing" that which is broken) under such a scheme. 190
The illiquidity of the rental housing as an asset and the very length of
time inherent in the investment would prevent or, at the very least,
substantially diminish, the landlord's ability to ever realize the gains
l!ll
of improving the housing. And so, once again, good cause eviction
requirements, by disincentivizing landlords from repairing and im
proving the land they own, tend to diminish the overall stock of qual
ity rental housing. 1 92
C.

Encouragi,ng Inefficient Housing Allocation

It is well-established that rent control encourages inefficient al
location of housing. Specifically, it encourages tenants to over
consume space and stay in places they neither need nor would be
able to afford absent regulation of the rent. 193 Good cause eviction
requirements also necessarily entail this problem. In fact, a tenancy
scheme adopting good cause eviction compounds it; essentially, the
risk under such a regime is magnified, as it exists both at the high
and low ends of the scale.
Lease contracts with a good cause eviction requirement are typi
cally required to have a somewhat lengthy term. w4 Indeed, the good
cause component would not offer the tenant the protection for which
the scheme is designed if the parties were permitted to perfect a lease
contract for an exceptionally short term. The combination, then, of
th e tenant security that comes with a good cause eviction require
ment, th e lengthy term of the lease, and the likelihood that rent con
trol exists will, at the very least, encourage tenants to stay in the prem-

Al11111d1111 111n11 and Rehabilitation: What is to be Done?, Papers Submitted to the Committee on
l!1111kil1i; aml. Currency, 92d Cong. . 3 1 5, 3 1 6-3 1 7 ( 1 9 7 1 ) (statement of George
_
Stern heh) . . -�"" WOI.MAN, supra note 1 58, at 66; see al.so KARN & WOLMAN, supra note 3,
;u

( Bnttsh landlords attempted to rectify the negative effects of ren t control

1 44

th rou�h undermainte nance ) .
l'KI

,

SAi .INS, supm note 1 52, at 92-93.
I .et• , .111/m1 note 1 43, at 5 5 1 -52.
1•1·1
Sn'. "K · David Kiefer, Hou.sing Deterioration, Housing Codes and Rent
Control' 1 7
l.'Rll. S n :im:s !>3, fi4 ( 1 980) ; see also Salins, supra note 1 2 ;t 777 r: 1 0
]'l'\
Nessle i n , rn/m1 note 1 63, at 1 268; Lee, supra note 1 43, at 546; see
al.so Epstein,
rn/m1 note 1 44, at �62 (n1�ting that a wealth test, which relies on ability to pay, better
1•11

·

'

•

•

·

matches persons w!lh avatlable premises, "with a minimum of fuss, bother
and political int rigue " ) .
, ., ,
I talian residential lease contract� may not be established for less
than four
yt'ars. French tenants have the right to a three-year minimum lease. Fixed
duration
lt'�tse con tracts are gene rally not allowed at all in Germany. See supra
notes 86, 130,
_
and 1 39 and accompanymg text.
'

2008]

GOOD CA USE EVICTION

457

ises longer than they otherwise might. As the tenant's family struc
ture changes-either expanding or contracting-the tenant remains
stagnan t. For the sector of society subject to a controlled tenancy re
gime, "inefficient distribution of housing consumption" results. !%
While rent control encourages tenants to over-consume, keeping a
larger apartment than necessary because of artificially low rent, a
good cause eviction requirement encourages both over- and under
consumption to avoid leaving the security of an existing tenancy for
the highly uncertain prospect of more suitable housing.
Moreover, the ridiculously high transaction costs and lengthy
wait that typically befall those renters seeking increased space stands
as a "substantial impediment to a household's ability to raise [its]
housing standard."196 The Swedish rental housing market, for in
stance, is plagued by significant difficulties in tenant mobility. Gov

ernment control over housing production without sufficient market
based information has resulted in a significant concentration of "av
erage-sized rental dwellings." 1 97 Ninety percent of the rental units in
Sweden have only three bedrooms. 1 98 Upgrading to a dwelling with
the needed space proves impossible, or exceptionally onerous, for
many families.
The effect of a non-market-driven and inefficient allocation of
rental housing is somewhat staggering. Substantial waste is created
under such a scheme, because new and appropriately-sized housing
must be constructed for families not able to find adequate vacant
housing. A 1 990 study of the Swedish rental housing market
estimated that if a small proportion of elderly Swedish households
relinquished their dwellings to larger families, the volume of con
struction could be reduced substantially.

Over a twenty-year pe

riod, it was estimated that it would be possible to reduce new con
struction by . . .

.

prod uct1on . . . .

199

roughly eighteen percent of total housing
200

In an increasingly populated world, such results should be pursued.
Achieving efficiency in housing allocation will serve to ensure that the
1 95

Nesslein, supra note 1 63, at 1 268 (referring to rent regulation only) .
Id.
19
7 Id. at 1 268-69.
198
Id. at 1 269. When compared with the fact that more than half of Swedish
owner-occupied homes have five bedrooms, this evidence is quite telling. Id.
LH9
Id. at 1 268.
1 96

200

According to 1998 estimates and projections of the United Nations, the world
population is growing at 1 .33 percent per year, an annual net addition of about 78
million people. World population in the mid-twenty-first century is expected to be in
the range of 7.3 to 10.7 billion and likely, by 2050, 8.9 billion. World Population Nears
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goal of a housing policy that supports a good cause eviction
01
scheme-namely, providing adequate housing for all-is m e t. 2
D.

Pushing Tenancies into the Black Market

There is one significant practical effect of good cause eviction
limitations that is almost certainly unintended, and likely unantici
pated, by proponents of the rules. The evidence shows that the sig
nificant disadvantages of good cause eviction schemes often cause
landlords to seek more workable alternatives elsewhere. The result is
a movement away from legal tenancy regimes altogether and into
other, less desirable, relationships.
In some cases, potential landlords disappointed with the effect
of a mandatory good cause eviction scheme have chosen to reject
tenancy in favor of an unlawful, totally uncontrolled, and even un
taxed, "black m arket" relationship. Poland, for instance, has had a
problem with the proliferation of black market tenancies in the wake
202 The p arties to
of the adoption of a good cause eviction regime.
such a relationship essentially attempt to operate outside the bounds
of the law altogether, foregoing every benefit of a legal c onstraint
03
upon both landlord and tenant. 2
Even in American jurisdictions with good cause eviction schemes
such black markets have emerged, though in a slightly less extreme
fashion than that seen in Poland. In New York, the passage of rent
control, along with good cause eviction limitations, has led to "brib
"204
ery and under-the-table payments .
"Key money" arrangements
have developed elsewhere whereby the landlord agrees to give the
tenant the protection mandated under a legal tenancy regime, but
0
requires him to pay an upfront fee for the privilege. 2 5 In these brib
ery and key money cases, the tenant m ay actually receive some of the

Six Billion, U . N .

CHRON., November 4, 1 998, available at http:/ /www. un. org/Pubs/

c h ronicle/ l 998/issue4/ 498p33.htm.
'"'
Lawrence C. Becker, Rent Control

( 1 989) .
:,?11�

:!fl'\
'.!•II

'""

Si'P CR0\1NJCKA &

is Not a Taking, 54 BROOK.

L. REV. 1 21 5 ' 1 2 1 8

ZYSK, supra note 1 42, at 30.

Id.

supra note 162, at 1 32.
supra note 1 43, at 63. For example, after restricting the right of

Rea & Gupta,
Sri' Cheung,

or

alter rent levels, the British government felt compelled to enact
the d e
RENTING
mand of "key mo ney" payments and other bribes a criminal offense.
1-lo�n:s, .111/Jm n ? te 1 64 , at 23; see alw Epstein, supra note 1 44, at 741 ( relating an ex
penence wherem he lost a "steal" of an apartment because, in his naivete, he did not
l a n dlords to set

the l n r r � ase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920, making

k n ow that the huilding superintendent " needed to have his palm smeared" ) .
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benefits of a legal tenancy regime, but only upon being forced to pay
a sum for which he is not legally obligated.
In other jurisdictions, landlords have not gone so far as to at
tempt to establish an extra-legal relationship, but rather have pur
posefully attempted to avoid the legal tenancy regime in favor of a
different legal bond.

In the United Kingdom, for example, a good

cause eviction scheme layered over rent control has led to a prevalent
practice on the part of owners to offer occupants "licenses" rather
20
than leases. 6 These owners "hoped [the licenses] might fall outside
the scope of the [tenancy] legislation, so that their properties were
not subject to rent regulation and their occupiers did not have long
0
term security of tenure . " 2 7 The license attempts have sometimes
been successful in avoiding the salient features of the tenancy regime,
0
and sometimes not. 2 8 Regardless of the outcome, however, these at
tempts at circumventing the appropriate legal relationship have been
exceptionally expensive to the taxpayer, who is left holding the bag
for judicial resources expended to enforce the good cause eviction
09
scheme adopted by his legislators. 2
Increasing Litigation

E.

The pragmatic effect of good cause eviction requirements on the
judicial system is substantial and negative. Such a regime tends to in
crease litigation between landlords and tenants in a number of ways.
For example, the good cause eviction requirement gives the landlord
an incentive to exploit relatively minor tenant breaches of contract.
In a free market for rental housing, landlords are likely to overlook
small tenant infractions, as pursuing eviction is time-consuming, ex
10
Where
pensive, and unlikely to provide much long-term benefit. 2
the tenant is paying the market rate, the gains for the landlord are
likely to be minimal. 211 At best, the landlord will reap minor finan
cial, though perhaps slightly more substantial emotional, reward if he
206
201
208

See RENTING HOMES, supra note 1 64, at 28.
Id.

Compare A.G. Securities v. Vaughan, ( 1 990] 1 A.C. 41 7 (H.L.) , with Street v.
Mountford, [ 1985] A.C. 809 (H.L.).
21�1

See Edgar Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL. ECON. 1081,
108 7 (19 7 2 ) .
210
Epstein, supra note 144, at 764.
211
See id.; see also AIMCO Properties, L.L.C. v. Dziewisz, 883 A.2d 3 1 0, 313 (N.H.
2005) ("Replacing one tenant upon the expiration of a lease with another tenant
who will pay the same rent and occupy the same position as the tenant being evicted
does not, in and of itself, provide the landlord of restricted property with any eco
nomic or business advantage." ) .
•
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dislikes his tenant. In a heavily regulated tenancy regime, h owever,
the situation is quite different. Faced with an exceptionally long term
lease, very likely an artificially-fixed low rent, and the inability to end
the relationship absent good cause, the landlord is likely to look for
that good cause wherever the slightest possibility of establishing it ex
212
The possibility of construing minor tenant infractions as "good
ists.
cause" for eviction gives the landlord an escape valve where before
there was none. "Removal for cause typically allows the landlord to
recapture a substantial portion of the unit's value . . . by removing the
unit from controls by 'rehabbing' it, or by selling it as a condomin
13
ium." 2 With the parties no longer willing or able to resolve their
214
disputes informally, courts must take on the added responsibility.
Moreover, rules requiring good cause for tenant eviction neces
sarily expand the court's role in policing the landlord-tenant rela
tionship to prevent the tenant harassment that is more likely to flow
215
under a good cause eviction scheme than under a free market.
Where the landlord is desperate to end the lease and remedy a sink
ing investment, the good cause eviction scheme may leave him little
hope. His inability to dispose of the property at will, particularly if he
finds no tenant misconduct to rely upon, certainly encourages him to
take any and all necessary steps to induce the tenant to leave volun16
tarily. Tenant harassment may result. 2
The costs of enforcing a rent control regime in New York for just
one year-1968-were estimated at $270 million, "a cost which was
borne by the taxpayers ." 217 Such increased cost and workload is a
',! [ :.!

Epstei n, supra note 144, at 764.
Id. at 765.
Id.; see also. Schlo n:i ing & Scholoming, supra note 1 84, at 532 (noting that the

11:1
''l ·I

.•

.

�vICtton proceedmg, �h1ch was originally supposed to be a quick, summary proceed
mg to regam possession of one's property, "has been turned into a potentially very
lengthy one by letting tenants or their lawyers file counterclaims against the owners
as ��rt of the eviction process itself," in effect prolonging litigation ) .
·

'llli

Sri' Lee, .mf>m note
.

most

143, at 551.

notono�s example of such tenant harassment was that perpetrated
.
hy Perec Rachman, a Bnush landlord in the 1 950s. Rachman handled tenants he
found un profi table by eit er offering them cash to vacate, making their lives intoler
.
.
able wnh
loud music
blaring at all hours of the night, or by cutting off their .utilities
and/'.1r dam agi ng their Plumbing. Rachman 's ill practices became so well known
.
that mappropnate behavior by landlords has since been dubbed "Rachmanism."
RENTINC HOMES, supra note
at 25 n.22; see Dave Cowan & Alex Marsh There's
The

?

.

164,

H1g11latnry Crime, and then There 's Landlord Crime: from 'Rachmanites ' to 'Part�ers', 64
Mon . L. RE\'.
(200 1 ) (debates about Rachman's shenanigans were partly re
.

sp

o ns1 hle

ing

83 1 , �37

for the nse of the Labour Party which enacted Britain's "emergency" hous

legislation ) .

�1'

Sn' Olsen,

132 n.8 1 .

su

pra note 209, at 1089-95; see also Rea

& Gupta ' sumt
"a n ote

162 ' at
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problem that both the legislatures and the courts of jurisdictions
propounding good cause eviction tenancy schemes must be prepared
to handle .
IV. THE D ISTURBING I NVASION OF G OOD
CA.USE EVICTION IN THE U NITED STATES
If the phenomenon of limiting tenant evictions to situations in
which the landlord can demonstrate good cause were limited to the
European countries, we might write the development off as a rela
tively benign one. Indeed, American and European laws, particularly
those concerning property, are quite different and developments in
one regi o n often do not carry over elsewhere.

218

Unfortunately, how-

ever, this is not true of good cause eviction requirements. Although
their acceptance in the United States does not come close to rivaling
that of their European counterparts, good cause eviction require
ments are increasingly creeping into the law of the American states.
The sources of and rationale for adoption of good cause eviction
requirements in this country h ave been varied.

But more and more,

they are beginning to reflect what could be characterized as the
European view-that tenant eviction must be limited to good cause to
honor a social policy-the right to decent housing for all individuals.
This view first permeated the public h ousing market. But today it has
crept into even the market for private housing, and thus constrains
landlords who lease with no governmental involvement.
A.

In the Public and "Quasi-Public " Housing Sectors

Public housing markets have long subjected the federal govern
ment landlord to stringent requirements not applicable to landlords
i n the private market.

219

The rationale is that public housing is a

form of welfare from the federal government, one to which the re
cipient is entitled.

220

This entitlement gives rise to a property interest,

which is protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

218

Andrea B. Carroll, .Examining a Comparative Law Myth: Two Hundred Years of Ri
L. REv. 901 , 943 (2006) (noting differences between civil
and common law property schemes) .
219
Marc Jolin, Good Cause Eviction and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 6 7 U. CHI.

parian Misconception, 80 TUL.

L. REV. 521 , 521-22 (2000) .
220
Joy v. Damels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1 242 (4th Cir. 19 73 ) ; see also Ressler v. Pierce, 692
F.2d 1 2 1 2, 1 2 1 5 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Section 8 program tenants held consti
tutionally protected property rights ) ; Jeffries v. Ga. Residential Fin. Auth., 6 78 F.2d
9 1 9 , 925 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 982).
•

•

•
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.
.
evict a publ1c
c
The governm ent may not, th ere1ore,
housing tenant at will. 222 The federal courts have held that evicting a
tenant from public housing merely b ecause his lease expired would
infringe upon the "property interest" the tenant has to continue re
2
ceiving his entitleme nt until there is cause to deprive him of it. 23 In
the public housing context, then, the landlord-the federal govern
ment-has subjected itself to a prohibition on evictions abse n t good

Amendm ent. 22

1

cause.

This prerequisite of good cause to evict has been extended be
yond traditional public housing-that owned by the federal govern

ment-and now applies equally to "quasi-public" landlords. Where
"the federal government has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependen ce with the landlord that it must be recognized as a
joint participant in the landlord-tenant relationship," 224 the landlord

is "quasi-public" and also constraine d by the good cause eviction
22"
Such a situation exists, for instance, where the government
rules.
partly finances the construction of private housing,

226

offers tax

breaks or mortgage interest rate reductions for the construction of
.
.
2'n
8
. .
.
or subs1d izes tenant rent. 22 " S ect1on 8" h ouslow-mcome h ous1ng,
ing is the most well-known program of this type,229 and even before its

written provisions expressly restricted landlords to evictions for good
;;i

Sepjoy, 479 F.2d at 124 1 ; see also Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1 342,
(Section 8 statutory "good cause" eviction requirements impli
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment) .
•11·1
- Housing and Urban Development Termination of Tenancy and Modification
of Lease, 24 C.F.R. § 880.607 (2007). Section 880.607 (b) ( l ) (iv) provides that "no
termination by an owner will be valid to the exten t it is based upon a lease or a provi
si on of State law permitting termination of a tenancy sol,ely because of expiration of
an i n i tial or subsequent renewal term." Id. (emphasis added) . The good cause pro
visions in � 880.607 apply to the Section 8 Housing Assistance Program, Section 202
D i rect Loan Program, Section 202 Supportive Housing for the Elderly Program, and
Section 8 1 1 Supp�>rtive Housing for Persons with Disabilities Program. In addition
.
.
lo prov1rlmg
speofic grounds for termination, the regulations provide that eviction
for "othn good cause" cannot occur unless the landlord has first provided prior no
tir
�� : 1f th(' offensive behavior to the tenant. 24 C.F.R. § 880.607 (b) (2) .
.
.frry. 479 F. 2d at 1 241.
,; , Green v. Copperstone Ltd. P'ship, 346 A.2d 686, 697 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1 97!1) .
,�-. jrry, 479 F.2 d at 1 242.
,.
_., GrPm, 346 A.2d at 695.
w Id.
"'"'
- Erlward H . Rabin, ThP Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant
Law: Causes and
Co',1;�,''l/lll'llrrs. 69 CORNELi. L. REV. 5 1 7, 535 ( 1 983) .
·· . SPf �4 (�.F.R. § 880 (2007) . The Section 8 program aims to provide low-income
famil 1es wi th decent, safe and sanitary rental housing through the
use of a system of
.
.
l�m1smg
assistance payments" paid to public or private housing owners.
Id.
I '.Hfi (4th Ci.-. 1 982)
cate the Due Process
·

••

_

.

� 880. ! 0 l (a) .
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cause, several courts of appeals held that such an interpretation was
necessary in light of the property interests held by the tenant. 230 The
intrusion upon the rights of the landlord is significant, but logical
where the landlord has depended upon the aid of the federal gov
ernment to achieve or maintain his status. In these "quasi-public"
situations, it is still the federal government that can fairly be called
the landlord. 231
Courts in this country typically hold both public and quasi-public
landlords to a good cause eviction standard because they view it as
the only possibility for meeting a social goal. Congress articulated
that "national goal" in the Housing and Urban Development Act to
be "a decent home and suitable living environment for every Ameri
can family."232 The good cause eviction requirement, it was hoped,
would insure "adequate, safe and sanitary quarters" and "an atmos
phere of stability, security, neighborliness, and social justice."233 This
social goal, and the expectation of tenure that it is said to create, has
even been held by the Fourth Circuit to rise to the level of a "cus230

See, e.g., Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1 342, 1 345 (4th Cir. 1982) ;
Rushie v. Berland, 502 N.Y.S.2d 359, 361 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1 986) (applying good cause
requirement before Section 8 expressly required it) ; Greenwich Gardens v. Pitt,
484 N .Y.S.2d 439, 442 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1 984) (articulating "well settled" view that Sec
tion 8 tenants are entitled to good cause protection ) . Since 1981, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(d) ( 1 ) (B) (ii) has expressly provided for eviction only for good cause.
31
2
Green, 346 A.2d at 697 (citing Appel v. Beyer, 1 14 Cal. Rptr. 336, 339 (Cal. App.
Deg't Super. Ct. 1974) ) .
' 32 The policy statement reads:
The Congress affirms the national goal, as set forth in [the Congres
sional Declaration of National Housing Policy] of a decent home and a
suitable living environment for every American family.
The Congress finds that this goal has not been fully realized for
many of the Nation's lower income families; that this is a matter of
grave national concern; and that there exist in the public and private
sectors of the economy the resources and capabilities necessary to the
full realization of this goal.
The Congress declares that in the administration of those housing
programs authorized by this Act which are designed to assist families
with incomes so low that they could not otherwise decently house
themselves, and of other Government programs designed to assist in
the p rovision of housing for such families, the highest priority and em
phasis should be given to meeting the housing needs of those families
for which the national goal has not become a reality; and in the carry
ing out of such programs there should be the fullest practicable utiliza
tion of the resources and capabilities of private enterprise and of indi
vidual self-help techniques.
Congressional Affirmation of National Goal of Decent Homes and Suitable Living
Environment for American Families, 1 2 U.S.C. § 170lt ( 1 968) (adopted as part of
th � �ousing and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 ( 1968) ) .
3
McQueen v. Druker, 3 1 7 F.Supp. 1 1 22, 1 130 (D. Mass. 1970 ) .
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Under this view, even without an express congressional ar

ticulation of a good cause eviction requirement, for public and quasi
public landlords, the requirement would exist nonetheless .
One can persuasively quibble with the imposition of good cause
eviction rules even in the public and quasi-public arenas, particularly
questioning whether they are capable of furthering the goal a t which
they are aimed. 235

But their imposition in these domains is at least

somewhat j ustifiable. Where the federal government acts as landlord,
it should be able to subject itself to restrictive termination provisions,
as it so desires.

Likewise, when it operates as the

de facto

landlord

( though a private person holds title) , it should be able to condition
its provision of assistance upon the imposition of restrictions on ter
mination, as it so desires.

In the Private Housing Sector

B.

It is in the market for housing that is entirely private that the in
vasion of good cause eviction is most disturbing.

And the m ove to

ward requiring that even private landlords with no governmental
connection refrain from evicting their tenants (even after the expira
tion of a term lease) without some "good cause" has only gain ed sway

i n the United S tates over the last one h undred years .

The groundwork for the American sanctioning of good cause
eviction requirements in the private market was laid in

Hirsh/:ii;

Block v.

a 1 92 1 decision of the Supreme Court of the United S tates.

In that case, Hirsh, a Washington, D.C. landlord, attem p ted to evict
his tenant after the term of the lease had run. 237 The tenant, Block,
argued that eviction was improper, since the District of Columbia
Ren ts Act at that time prohibited a landlord from evicting a tenant,
even when his lease was expired, without other good cause. 238

Hirsh

countered that such a rule would "cut down" his right "to do what he

will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases . "2:in

The S upreme Court upheld Block's right to retain possession of

the rented premises and rejected landlord Hirsh's contention that

the res ult amounted to an unconstitutional taking. 240 The Court justi
fied its decision by pointing out that the effect of the D . C. Rents Act

�:.·
·
.

'''ih
·

�:r;
:!.�
:!.t� ·
:! Il

l

. J oy \'.

Dan ids,

4 79 F.2d 1 236, 1 24 1 (4th Cir. 1 973) .

Srr rn/>m Part I I I .

:!56
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

LS. 1 3!1 ( 1 92 1 ) .

at

ac

at

1 5'.t
I ?>3-54.
I :1 7 .
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was a fleeting one. 241 The statute was emergency legislation passed in
the wake of World War I to combat an increasingly stressed rental
housing market. 242 This emergency legislation was only to last two
years, 243 further indicating that it was appropriately aimed at solving
the post-War housing problems of Washington, D.C. Hirsh 's interests
were, therefore, set aside, and his lease to Block presumably perpetu
ally continued, at least until Hirsh could make out some just cause for
Block's eviction.

1.

The Spread of Good Cause Eviction Across America

Post-Block, good cause eviction requirements took hold in some
states and municipalities as a set of rules applicable to rental housing
in general and in still more as a set of special rules applicable only to
particularly "vulnerable tenants." Viewing these jurisdictions to
gether clearly demonstrates that the good cause eviction require
ments so prevalent in Europe are making no small gains in the
United States as well.
a.

The Market for Ordinary Dwellings244

Good cause eviction requirements imposed upon ordinary dwell
ings in this country have come in a number of forms. Some exist only
as a corollary to and enforcer of a scheme of rent control. Others
stand alone as default rules applicable to virtually all dwelling places.
i.

Good Cause Eviction as a Corollary to Rent Control

Although good cause eviction schemes currently exist in a num
ber of American jurisdictions, 245 perhaps the most well-known scheme
41
2

242

243
244

Id. at 1 54.
Block, 256 U.S. at 154.
Id.

The phrase "ordinary dwelling" is used here in contrast to special dwellings,
such as mobile homes, discussed supra Part N.B.l .b.
2
45 See, e.g.� Arizona Mobile Home Parks Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1476 (LexisNexis 1975 ) ; Arizona Recreational Vehicle Long
Term Rental Space Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-2143 (LexisNexis 2000) ; Connecticut
Mobile Manufactured Homes, CONN . GEN. STAT. § 21-80 ( 1974) ; District of Columbia
Rental Housing Evictions, D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01 (200 1 ) ; Florida Mobile Home
Park Lot Tenancies, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 723.061 (West 1984) ; Massachusetts Local
Control of Rents and Evictions, MAss. GEN. 1.Aws ANN. ch. 40 § 1-9 (West 1970); New
Hampshire Termination of Tenancy, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 ( 1985 ) ; New Jer
sey Removal of Residential Tenants, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: l8-6 1 . 1 (West 2000) ; New
York Rent Control Act, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408 (McKinney 1985 ) . For an ex
ample of a local ordinance adopting good cause provisions, see Just Cause for Evic
tion Ordinance, OAKLAND, CAL., O.M.C. § 8.22 .3 (2002) .
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hails from New York. Good cause eviction is in place there to effec
tuate a scheme of rent control that New York City has had since
6
1 943 . 24 The gist of the New York law is that a tenant may not be

evicted, "notwithstanding the fact that the tenant has no /,ease or that
his or her /,ease . . . has expired or otherwise terminated" absen t certain

statutorily prescribed grounds or until the landlord obtains the nec
essary "certificate of eviction." 247 Seven grounds for which a landlord
may evict are then set out, most of them geared toward tenant mis
8
conduct. 24

The landlord's rope under this statute is tied tight. A property

owner seeking to recover possession for his own use will find himself
out of luck under the statutorily enumerated grounds.

But the stat

ute goes on to mandate that the city grant a certificate of eviction

when it finds that " [t] he landlord seeks in good faith to recover pos

session of a housing accommodation because of immediate and

compelling necessity for his or her own personal use and occupancy

or for the use and occupancy of his or her immediate family. " 249

This "good faith" and "immediate and compelling necessity"

standard was applied to reject the landlord 's eviction request in Bu
hagi,ar v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal

2''0

Petitioner Buhagiar owned a five-apartment building that she pur
51
She sought an order to evict the
chased with the intent to occupy. 2
tenant in a six-bedroom unit of the building so that she and her

21'!

York

SALINS, supra note 1 52, at 6 1 ; Rent &gulation After 50 Years-An Overview of New
State's Rent &gulated Housing, TENANTNET NEWSLETTER 1993, availabl,e at http://

www.tenant.net/Oversight/50yrRentReg/history. html (describing what was origi
nally intended as a "temporary emergency measure" as a now "stable fixture" in New
York, with " 1 . 2 million of New York State' s 3.3 million rental housing accommoda
tions . . . subject to rent regulation" ) .
m N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(a) (McKinney 1985) (emphasis added ) ; see a Lm
Duell v. Condon, 647 N.E.2d 96, 99 (N.Y. 1 995) (even nonsignatory to lease gets pro
tection of New York good cause eviction scheme ) .
2i"
N.Y. UNCO�SOL LAW § 26-408 (a) (McKinney 1 985) . The grounds for eviction
:
are: ( 1 ) tenant v10lanon of lease obligations; ( 2 ) tenant commission of nuisance or
gross negligence; (3) illegal occupancy; (4) immoral or illegal use; ( 5 ) tenant refusal
to renew upon demand; (6) unreasonable tenant refusal to allow landlord access to
the rental unit f? r necessary repairs, i mprovem ents, or inspections; or
(7) eviction
under a conversion pursuant to a written eviction plan submitted to the attorney
general. Id.
21�

�

Id. § 2 08(b) ( 1 ) . Such landlord requests are policed with treble damages; if
a landlord eVJcts a tenant alleging his own need and then fails to
use the premises to
fulfill that need, the evicted tenant may recover treble damages, plus attorneys fees
'
and costs. Id. § 26-408 (g) ( l ) (e ) .
� :\()
�·1 1

525 N.Y.S.2d 2 0 2 ( N.Y. App. Div. 1 988) .
Id. at 202.
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daughter could personally occupy the space. 252

Buhagiar demon

strated that her living space at the time she sought eviction

was

smaller than the space at issue (albeit by just one room) , that she
paid more in rent for her smaller apartment than her tenants were
paying, and that she needed a ground floor apartment because of
medically substantiated knee problems and hypertension. 255

Never

theless, the New York State Division of Housing and Community Re
newal ( DHCR) essentially held that Buhagiar's living conditions at

the time she sought the eviction order were "adequate," and that she

therefore failed to show the requisite "immediate and compelling ne
cessity." 254 And while the New York appellate court suggested that

immediate and compelling n ecessity may not be restricted to "inade

quate h ousing," 255 it affirmed the DHCR's decision to deny Buhagiar
the requested eviction certificate . 255

The result, of course,

was

that

Buhagiar was simply stuck in an undesirable situation, waiting for a

tenant to voluntarily vacate, or perhaps commit some misconduct, in
order to take full advan tage of her investment.

Even if a New York landlord can do what Buhagiar could not

and meet the good faith and compelling need tests, eviction certifi
cates are unavailable, regardless of landlord need, when the tenant to

be evicted is at least sixty-two, has lived in the building for at least

twenty years, or has a permanent medical condition that disables him

from "gainful employment." 257 The case of Dawson v. Higgi,ns258 brings

to light the severity of such a rule for the landlord. Joan Dawson pur

chased a Manhattan brownstone housing two rent-controlled tenants
in November of

1983. 259

She planned to evict those tenants when

their leases expired so that she and her adult family members could

personally occupy the spaces.

But on June

19, 1984, just seven

months after Dawson purchased the building, the above-described

provision prohibiting eviction of any tenant who has rented for at
60
least twenty years came into effect. 2
"The amendment applied to
' any tenant in possession at o r after the time it [took] effect. ' "261 As
such, the statute applied to preclude Dawson from evicting the long252
2

53
5
2 4
2:,r,
211t;

Id.
Id. at

202-04.

Id.
Id. at

203-04.

57
�
5
2

Buhagi,ar, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 204.
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-408(b) ( 1 ) (McKinney
6 1 0 N.Y.S.2d 200 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) .

2r�•
2ti1

Id. at

2

2rm

Id. at
Id.

129.
131.

1985 ) .
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standing tenant, even for her own personal use of the brownstone.
Dawson challenged the provision as an unconstitutional taking and
lost.262 The New York court noted particularly the wide government
6
"latitude in regulating landlord-tenant relations."2 3 And though it
did not explicitly so state, it evidenced a willingness to grant such lati
tude even when those relations are wholly private.
The restrictive interpretation of the need standard in

Buhagiar,

and the extreme protection given to longstanding, elderly, or ill ten
ants by New York statute, serve to explain why the rental housing
market in New York is such a risky one for prospective investors. The
relationship that a party purchasing rental property enters into is an
inflexible and seemingly perpetual one. Even if a landlord is not dis
advantaged by either of these rules, because he does not seek to oc
cupy the property himself or to evict a needy tenant, he may be oth
erwise disadvantaged should he try to free himself of his investment.
A New York landlord may seek an eviction certificate in order to re
model or demolish the premises, 264 but the city is prohibited from

granting a certificate for such a purpose unless it finds that "there is
no reasonable possibility that the landlord can make a net annual re
turn of eight and one-half per centum of the assessed value of the
subject property."265 Thus, the New York investor is likely to consider

long and hard before purchasing rental housing.

Chances are quite

good that he may never escape the investment.
1 1.

Good Cause Eviction as a Default Rule of Tenancy

Through a

1974

Anti-Eviction Act, the State of New Jersey sub

jects nearly all tenancy contracts to the requirement that landlords
260
And unlike
refrain from evicting their tenants absent good cause.
67
New York, New Jersey's provisions operate absent rent controls. 2
The New Jersey good cause eviction legislation provides that "no les
see or tenant . . . may be removed by the Superior Court from any
house, building, mobile home or land in a mobile home park or
�li'l

Id. at 1 3 1-32.
Id. at 1 32.
:.?t>-1
"';·. N.Y. UNCONSO L. L\w § 26408(b) (3)-{4) (McKinne
y 1985 ) .
Id. � 26408(b) (5) (a) .
�tlfi
SPl' J;Pllt>mlZv NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 1 8-6 1 . 1 (West 2000 ) .
Sn• Rabin, supra note 228, at 535. Similarly, voters i n Oakland
California
adoptt·d a scheme of "just cause" eviction in 2002. Just Cause for Eviction Ordi
nann', 0.\KL\ND, CAL. , 0.M.C. § 8.22.320(6 ) (2003) . The ordinance that effectuates
the sc h e me ex � ressly states that its purpose is to remedy a spike in evictions caused
by th e ehm111 '.1t1 m of rent control. Id. Thus, like New Jersey's rules, the Oakland
'.
good cause evJCtton scheme operates independ ent of rent control.
:!Ii'\

.,

_

·'"
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tenement leased for residen tial purposes . . . except upon establish
ment of one of [eighteen] grounds as good cause. " 268
That there exist eighteen causes for eviction implies that the
grounds for eviction must be rather broad; it suggests, perhaps, that
the requirement of proving good cause before evicting may even be
perfunctory. A close examination of the enumerated grounds, how
Landlords are well protected
ever, demonstrates the contrary.
against tenants that fail to pay rent, commit crimes or gross
9
negligence, or otherwise breach the lease in some significant way. 26
But where the New Jersey landlord merely seeks to dwell in the rental
unit himself, he may find the statute wanting.
While landlords renting buildings with "three residential units or
less" need only prove their desire to personally occupy in order to
evict or refuse renewal to an existing tenant, landlords renting build
ings with four or more units may not evict for personal need. 270 In
Stamboulos v. McKee, 27 1 the landlord sought to demonstrate the inva
siveness of this particular provision on landlord rights. Stamboulos
purchased a four-unit apartment building partially occupied by
month-to-month tenants who had been there for a number of
years. 272 On the same day as the transfer of title, Stamboulos gave no
tice to defendants that their lease was being terminated. 273 The no
tice to quit was given at a time when all that was required of a land
lord to terminate a month-to-month tenancy in New Jersey was a
thirty-day notice. 274 Twenty-six days after the notice was given-and
just five days before the lease was to terminate-the New Jersey legis
lature passed the good cause eviction statute described above.275 Be
cause Stamboulos's building contained four units, his desire to per
sonally occupy the unit was irrelevant; no good cause was
demonstrated. 276 Stamboulos argued that the application of the new
statute , and its effective deprivation of his right to occupy his own
building, amounted to an unconstitutional violation of his "funda,,
.
menta1 property ngh ts. 277

268

2t;<:J
270
271

272

213

274
275

276

277

NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: l 8-61 .l (West 2000) .
Id. § 2A: l 8-61 .l (c) .
Id. § 2A: l 8-6 1 . l (l) ( l ) - (3) .
342 A.2d 529 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1 975) .
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stamboulos, 342 A.2d at 5 3 1 .
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It first held that the

new statute applied to limit the grounds for which Stamboulos could
evict his tenant, even though he purchased the building and served
notice to quit before its passage. 278 The court held that before the
thirty-day notice had run, Stamboulos had no vested right to evict and
thus there was no problem with applying the new statute to limit him

to evicting for good cause. 279

As to Stamboulos' substantive objec

tions, the court noted his argument that the new legislation "in effect
converts a month-to-month tenancy to a perpetual tenancy, termina
ble . . . at the will of the tenant," but only for "good cause" by the
landlord. 280 Nevertheless, the court upheld the statute on c onstitu
tional grounds, finding it an appropriate exercise of governmental
1
The legislative history demonstrated that the purpose of
power. 28
the statute was to rectify a "critical shortage of rental housing space in
New Jersey," and the court apparently found a good cause eviction
rule an adequate means of addressing that problem. 282
The

Stamboulos

court seemed to recognize the absurdity of the

statute's failure to "permit the good faith intention of the landlord to
occupy the rented premises to serve as a reason for terminating the
tenancy or obtaining possession." 283 It disclaimed any knowledge of
"whether this was an oversight or not." 284 Absent an express p rovision
in the statute providing good cause for owner desire to occupy, the
5
court did not feel it could create such a rule. 28

Stamboulos demonstrates well

81i
for the New Jersey landlord. 2

needed use

the pitfalls of a good cause scheme
He was prevented from making a

of the property by a statute that

did not even exist at

the time

of his investment in the building. What potential investor would pur
sue rental property under such a tenant-friendly regime? In the face
of recent New Jersey jurisprudence providing that the Anti-Eviction
Act is to be "construed liberally with all doubts construed in favor of a

�jH

11�1

�Ho
:l t
H

:.?H:t
:tw\
:t1-1-•
�W1

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

a t !>3 l .
at 532.
at

533.

a t 53 1 .

Sta·rnboulos,

342 A.2d at 532.

Id.
Id.

an d l or?s seeking to "occupy" their units for business purposes, rather than as
a pe�·sonal residenc e, have suffered the same fate as Stamboulos. See, e.g. , Gross v.
�"';

L

Barnos1,

401 A.2d 1 1 27 ( Passaic County Ct. 1979 ) ; Puttrich v. Smith, 407 A.2d 842
(\lj. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1 979) .
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tenant," the potential landlord 's incentives appear all the more
bleak.287
New Jersey is certainly not alone among American jurisdictions
with stand-alone good cause eviction regimes. Washington, D. C. has
such a regime, which, like New Jersey's, operates independent of rent
control and is exceptionally tenant-friendly. 288 The D.C. legislation
sets out a limited number of reasons for which a landlord may termi
nate or refuse to renew a tenant's lease. 289 And then, much like

European law-particularly that of France-it forestalls eviction for
any reason, including the enumerated "good" causes, in freezing
weather. 290 Specifically, the statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no housing
provider shall evict a tenant on any day when the National
Weather Service predicts at 8:00 a.m. that the temperature at the
National Airport weather station will fall below 32 degrees Fahr

enheit or 0 degrees Centigrade within the next 24 hours. 29 1

Washington, D.C.'s good cause eviction legislation, like that of
most jurisdictions, has been interpreted liberally, such that it rather
substantially restricts the rights of landlords. 292 Even seizing mortgagees

are bound by the D.C. law, and are therefore precluded from evicting
existing ( non-mortgagor) tenants absent good cause. 293 Washington
appellate courts have acknowledged that this application of the good
cause eviction requirement "tend [s] to depress the value of the prop
erty," but they continue to apply the statute to mortgagees nonethe
less. 294
b.

"Special" Tenancies

A surprising number of American states have adopted good
cause eviction schemes for particular types of tenancy contracts that
287

224 Jefferson St. Condo. Assoc. v. Paige, 788 A.2d 296, 302 (NJ. Super. Ct.
APR · Div. 2002) .
AA
See D. C CODE § 42-3505.01 (200 1 ) ; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:2 ( 1985)
(providi ng for a scheme of good cause eviction in New Hampshire) .
289
. D.C. CODE § 42-3505. 0 1 (2001 ) .
2\)()
Compare Law No. 90-449 of May 3 1 , 1990 U.O.] [Official Gazette of France] ,
June 2, 1990, p. 6551 , art. 2 1 , availabk at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr (follow "Les
autres textes legislatifs et reglementaires" hyperlink) , with D.C. CODE § 42-3505.01
(2001 ) .
291
D . C . CODE § 42-3505.01 (k) (200 1 ) .
w2
See Adm 'r of Veterans Affairs v. Valentine, 490 A.2d 1 1 65, 1 1 68 (D.C. 1985)
("eviction restrictions . . . are only a part of a comprehensive legislative scheme to
protect the rights of tenants and therefore must be construed liberally") .
9
2 3 Id.
294
Id. at 1 1 70.
.
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state legislatures typically deem "special," and thus worthy of hefty
tenant protection . The most striking example of such a tenancy is
that in a mobile home park. The basic principle of tenant tenure
provisions in these areas is that owners of mobile home parks may not
evict mobile home owners-and thereby force them to pick up and
move their mobile homes to another locale-absent "good cause."295
Much like good cause eviction requirements imposed u p o n ten
ancies in traditional dwellings, good cause eviction schemes adopted
for mobile home parks are typically passed to alleviate a "major
shortage of space for mobile homes . " 296 The shortage in the mobile
home context is often much more significant than the shortage of
rental housing stock in general because many municipalities either
"exclude mobile homes altogether" or restrict the areas in which they
may be set up. 2�17 D emand quite often exceeds supply.

To give mobile home owners ("tenants" in the mobile home

park) some degree of protection in a landlord-focused market, a
number of states have turned to good cause eviction rules . Typically,
park owners may not evict mobile home owners except for "non
payment of reasonable rent, continuing violation of reasonable park
rules, continuing violation of mobile home laws, or change in the use
of the land . "298 To date, at least twenty states have adopted a good
cause eviction scheme for mobile home tenants. 299

2.

The Impact of Good Cause Eviction on American
Landlords and the Rental Housing Market

The common thread linking the New York, New Jersey, and
Washingto n , D . C . good cause eviction rules for ordinary dwellings
and the adoption of such schemes for special tenancies is, at base, the
"''··

Sw gmf'mlly Thomas Moukawsher, Co mm e n t Mobil£ Horne Parks and Connecti
,

rnt,;�, Ht'l(lllalory Srltmte: A 'faking.� Analysis,
·

'.!' I i'

""'
""''

fd. at 8 1 4 .

1 7 CONN. L.

REV.

8 1 1 ( 1 985) .

fd. at 8 1 '.1-1 4 .
fd. at 8 1 7.

AIASKA STAT.

§ 34.03.225 ( 1 976) ; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1 476 ( 1 975) ;
,
Com: � 800.7 1 (West 1 990) ; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1 2-202 to -203
(Wes t 1 9n) : CONN. GF.N. STAT. ANN. § 2 1 -80 (West 1 974) ; DEi:. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
�l:i 7007, 70 I OA ( 1 97 1 ) ; FLA.. STAT. ANN. § 723.061 (West 1 984) ; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
1 0. l:l !)Im ( 1 987) ; MD. CODE ANN., REAL P ROP. § 8A-1 1 0 1 (West 1 976) ; MASS. GEN.
L\\\'S �\N:'\. c h . 1 40. � 3�J (West 1 950) ; M I NN. STAT. ANN. § 327C.09 (West 1 98 2 ) ; N.H.
RI·T. ST,\T. ANN. l:i 20fiA:3 ( 1 988) ; N.M . STAT. ANN § 47-1 0-5 (West 1 978) ; N.Y.
REAL
PROP. L\\\" l:i 223 ( McKinney 1 974) ; 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 398.3 (West 1 976) ; R.I. GEN.
L\WS � ::1 �:i-2 ( 1 956 ) ; TEX. PROP. Coor: ANN. § 94.201 (Vernon 2002 ) ; UTAH CODE
·�N�. � !l 1·Hl:4 ( 1 953) ; Vr. STAT, �N�. tit. 10, S 6237 ( 1 973) ; WASH. REV. CODF, ANN. §
. � (v\est 1 977) . But_St'P_
:>9,�0.08(
S.C'.. CooE AN_N. � 27-47-530 ( 1 976) (allowing a landlord
.
to C\ 1ct 1f 1 ent 1s not paid w1thm jml' days of us due date) (emphasis added) .
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implementation of social policy. Some jurisdictions purport to adopt
these requirements in an aim to cure housing shortages. 300 Al/justify
good cause eviction schemes by pointing to "what they perceive as a
strong public policy in favor of providing decent housing."301 It is a
laudable goal, of course.
The problem is that using a good cause eviction scheme to at
tempt to effectuate this goal necessarily, and unduly, burdens private
landlords. Who should bear the burden of ensuring adequate hous
ing in this country-the government or private landowners? New Jer
sey has clearly recognized this tension and answered that question.
Its supreme court has held that application of the Anti-Eviction Act
necessarily means that "landlord rights must to some extent and on
general welfare grounds defer to the needs of the tenant population
in [the ] state."302 Most jurisdictions are not so candid about the ef
fects of a good cause eviction scheme. They seem to opine that ten
ants deserve special protection by the law and to conclude that good
cause eviction requirements are the only-or at least the best-means
of achieving that protection. But the cost of the protection to private
individuals carrying the status of "landlord" is seldom remembered.
Two private interests are involved, and American states that adopt
good cause evictions schemes must recognize that in so doing, they
are impliedly adjudging "that the tenant's interest in his home and
the public 's interest in maintaining the supply of rental units are
more important than the landlord's investment."303
The experiences of both the European and American jurisdic
tions that have adopted good cause evictions schemes should cer
tainly give a state considering the balance between landlord and ten
ant rights pause. Both here and abroad, empirical evidence has
shown that good cause eviction schemes serve neither to boost rental
supply nor to bolster its quality. In fact, precisely the opposite is
true. 304
In the U nited States, an examination of rent control schemes
imposed on ordinary dwellings demonstrates the inability of good
300

See, e.g., Rea & Gupta, supra note 162, at 1 05, 108 (noting that rent control, and
likewise good cause eviction, first gained sway in this country as a response to hous
ing shortages caused by World War I) .
30 !
Salzberg & Zibelman, supra note 15, at 64.
302
Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. New Mexico, 725 A.2d 1 1 04, 1 1 1 0 (NJ. 1999 ) .
303 Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23
B.C. L. REv. 503, 544 ( 1 982 ) .
304
For a discussion of the abysmal long term effects of good cause eviction in
Sweden and the United Kingdom, for instance, see supra notes 1 64-69, 1 73-8 1 and
accompanying text.
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cause eviction rules to remedy housing problems. Studies of rent
control schemes with good cause eviction requirements that formerly
existed in Boston, for example, have demonstrated that the regime's
institution promoted a sixty-seven percent drop in construction in the
private market. '°5 Other cities saw a boost in construction over that
same period. 306 In New York, rent controlled apartments with a good
cause eviction requirement are dilapidated much more frequently
than their non-rent-controlled counterparts-a difference of twenty
nine to thirty percent. 307 The housing situation is so bad in New York
that one housing policy expert has remarked:
One does not have to be an advocate of laissez-faire, nor an
ideological conservative to remark that when it comes to housing
in New York, the public sector has done quite enough already.
Up to now every new increment of public intervention has made
things worse.

We have taken so many unsuccessful twists and

turns along the path of well-intentioned tinkering that perhaps it
is time to test the possibility that generally reasonable incentives

and disincentives of an unconstrained market mi 9oht do a better

job of allocating and conserving the housing stock.

8

Even where good cause eviction has stood alone in this country,
without rent control to boost its effect, it has failed miserably. Good
cause eviction schemes in the mobile home context have had near
disastrous results. It might have been anticipated-merely through
the application of basic economic principles-that a good cause evic
tion regime would do nothing to remedy a supply problem. Indeed,
by discouraging landlord investment in a venture that may quickly
become unprofitable , good cause eviction requirements should have
been expected to increase problems with supply. The market evidence
shows that good cause eviction schemes in mobile home parks have
done precisely that.
Connecticut, one of the earlier states to enact a good cause evic
tion scheme for mobile home park tenants, has seen, in the wake of
the scheme's adoption, a proliferation of park closings. �09 And even
beyond supply problems, Connecticut has been forced to confront
rather serious park owner abuses, exceptionally lengthy delays in evic-

w
: 1;,
:1116
�)i
«
: »4
'.iD9

Rea & Gupta, supra note 1 62 , at 1 28 n.68.
Id.
Id. at 1 29 n. 73.
SALINS, supra note 1 5 2, at xix.
Moukawsher, supra note 295, at 832 n . 1 07.
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tion proceedings, and a general state of increased animosity among
landlords and tenants. 31 0
Good cause eviction schemes both for ordinary dwellings and in
the mobile home park context, then, have wholly failed to meet their
social and economic goals of protecting tenants by insuring adequate
housing and rectifying social problems. The reality is that they have
decreased both the availability and quality of rental housing.
V.

A GROWING NEED TO RESIST THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT

Rules restricting a landlord to evicting a tenant or refusing to
renew his lease for good cause, quite obviously, represent a rather
substantial intrusion upon private property rights. Blackstone de
fined the essence of the right to property as the "free use, enjoyment,
and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminu
tion, save only by the laws of the land."31 1 Even at civil law, the right
of ownership has been defined as an absolute one. 3 12 A property
owner in any legal system "has an inherent right to control the dispo
sition of her property as she sees fit. "31 3 Indeed, most agree that there
is no concept of ownership divorced from rights of use and abuse . 31 4
C ertainly any landowner that enters into a lease is voluntarily re
stricting his own right of dominion over his land. But that intrusion
upon the rights of the landlord should go only as far as his lease
agreement has permitted. Lease has always been regarded as a tem
porary right. 315 When the period for which a landlord consented to
restriction of his use has ended, the landlord's right to retake the
property is generally considered unfailing. The state should not be
able to change this result without the landowner's consent, as the
right to enjoy property and to be free from governmental intrusion
"is the essence of liberty. "31 6
Good cause eviction requirements intrude upon the province of
the landlord in such a fundamental way that they can only be said to
310

Id. at 831-32.
1 WILLIAM BIACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139. Blackstone refused to accept in
trusion upon private owners' rights to achieve social goals. "So great, moreover, is
the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation
of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community." Id.
312
The essence of property at civil law is that "it is exclusive, that is to say, it con
sists in the attribution of a thing that to a given person is to the exclusion of all oth
ers." PLANIOL, supra note 149, at 378.
13
3
Salzberg & Zibelman, supra note 15, at 62.
:i r4 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 1 35, 1 65 ( 1921 ) (McKenna, J., dissenting) .
1
� 5 Id.
316
Id.
31\
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alter the very notion of what it means to hold property.

31 7

38:427
" [T] he

'sticks in the bundle of rights' that compose the p roperty interest in a
leasehold have been reallocated between landlord and tenant" to
achieve social and economic goals. m

This redistribution is signifi

cant-it deprives the landlord of some of his most basic rights, i n ef
fect, converting a term tenancy he perfected into something m o re
akin to a life estate, terminable at will by the tenant but lastin g in
near perpetuity for the landlord.

31!1

There simply is no theoretical jus

tification for such a subversion of a property owner's rights. The oft
proffered j ustificatio n that "tenants are more n umerous than land
lords and that in som e way this disproportion . . . makes a tyranny in
32
the landlord" 0 simply does not withstand critical scrutiny.
What is perhaps most disturbing abou t the proliferation of good
cause eviction requirements is that they seem to utterly fail at meet
ing their intended goals.
cial.

Economically, the schemes are not benefi

In the long term, they certainly do not serve to increase rental

housing supply, which is ironic given that this is the principal reason
offered for their promulgation.

32 1

Indeed, evidence from Sweden,

and even closer to home in Connecticut, shows that good cause evic
tion requirements tend to

decrease

the rental housing stock.

More

ove r, good cause eviction requirements do not appear to make any

headway in promoting the social goal of decent housing for every in
dividual.

To the contrary, they serve to lessen the quality of rental

housing, while simultaneously diminishing its quan tity.
The failure of good cause eviction schemes to even begin to
remedy housing problems in Europe and i n their limited domain in
the U nited States j ust underscores the importance of the recognition
in this coun try that good cause eviction must not be furthe r im
ported .

There is no reason to believe that a scheme which has not

worked abroad, and has not worked either alone or in combination
with rent control here , will prove usefu l .

Protection of the social right t o housing is important, a n d to

some extent, the rights of individuals in private property will simply
have to suffer.

With a homelessness crisis that has by now touched

'"

This mod i f.ication to the le ase rel a t ionship has been described as one "contrary
to en-ry rn11l-e p 11on of l eas s that the world has ever entertained, and of the recipro
cal rights and obhgauons ot lessor and lessee . " Id. at 1 59 .

�

11'

·q·•
.1�1·
1�1

'-'
I · 1 em I011 , s11/nn note 303, a t 544.

Id. at 54� .

�

( Mc Ke n na , .J . , disset ting) .
.
(.enerally s peakmg, from a comprehensive perspective, it is the long-te rm, ef

:,11:uk, 2!i6 U .S. at 1 6 1

.
f1c1ent lunct1on111g of the sector as a whole that is the prime objective of policy."
_

AJ\CEL,

.111/m1 note

1 43, at 295.

2008]

477

GOOD CA USE EVICTION

most parts of the world,322 it is clear that something must be done.
Governments must aid in insuring their populations the safest and
best housing possibl e . But the dream of

Les Enfants de Don Quichotte is

indeed an impossible one if it is to be remedied through good cause
eviction schemes. They are simply not a suitable means of achieving
that goal.
The recent spread of the view of housing as a fundamental right
in Europe cannot help but further permeate American law and soci
ety.

At least nine countries now recognize the availability of decent

housing as a basic human right. 323 And already, this movement is tak
ing hold in this coun try. 324

As recently as

2002,

voters in Oakland,

California approved a scheme of good cause eviction with a view to
protecting the "human right" to "safe , decent, and sanitary hous
ing. " :1:15 The United States government has likewise detailed the social
objective of "ensuring 'a decent home for every family at a price
within their means. "'320 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in

2005,

the

State of Louisiana offered incentives to small landlords for repairing
storm-damaged rental housing in an effort to provide affordable
rental housing to low income families. 327

The view of the right to

adequate and affordable housing as one which society must ensure to
8
all, then, is stronger than ever in the United States. 32
The danger here is that we fall into the trap of believing that
good cause eviction requirements can help us protect this right and
to meet our social goals on housing. As we come closer in the United

States to accepting the burgeoning international social policy on the
righ t to housing, the question becomes whether we can possibly stave
off the flawed international solution to the housing problem. I argue
that we must, or face the fate of our foreign counterparts that have

tried good cause eviction schemes and failed on both economic and
social fronts.

The intrusion of the scheme must be stopped, lest it

damage the American housing situation more.
·
'22

'23
·
324

See HUGHES, supra note 1 57, at 398.
See supra note 1 1 .

See, e.g., W. Dennis Keating, Commenta ry on Rent Control and the Theory of Ef
ficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1 223, 1 226 ( 1 989) (discussing Epstein, supra
note 1 44) .
'2"
·
'l26

327

Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance, 0AK1AND, CAL. , O.M.C. § 8.22.300 (2003 ) .

ANGEL,

supra note 1 43 , at 1 5.

Press Release, Louisiana Recovery Authority, LRA Explains Occupancy Rules
for Small Rental Property Program: Landlords Warned Against Evicting Tenants in
Order to Apply for Program (March 1 3, 2007) , available at http://www. lra.louis
iana.gov/pr031 307rental.html.
3 8
2

See Berger, supra note 5 , at 324-25 (proposing that the United States "guaran
tee" ba5ic housing to all individuals) .

